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The Control of Reproductive Hazards
in the Workplace: A Prescription
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Nicholas A. Ashfordt
Charles C. Caldartt
As workers become more aware that occupational exposure to toxic
substances can impair their ability to bring healthy children into the world.
they will begin to focus on legal mechanisms for reducing reproductive
hazards in the workplace. The authors explore the use of compensatory
remedies and anti-discrimination laws to provide an impetusfor employers
to provide safe workplaces. hey investigate using workerprotection laws
to reach psychological injuries and harm to offspring. They also survey
existing preventive tools such as injunctive relief and the right to refuse
hazardous work.
INTRODUCTION
In coming years we may see a shift in the emphasis and intensity
of worker initiatives to promote health and safety in the workplace. It
is becoming increasingly clear that the effects of occupational exposure
to toxic substances are not confined to the worker. More and more, we
are learning that occupational exposures can also impair both the
health of the worker's future children and his or her ability to have
those children. The practical effects of this discovery may be profound.
Even if workers are willing to accept a degree of risk to their own
health as a condition of employment, they may be far less willing to
accept risks to their ability to bring healthy children into the world.
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Reproductive hazards may soon become a major focus of workplace
health and safety.
This article explores the principal regulatory and legal mecha-
nisms available to reduce the level of exposure to reproductive hazards
in the workplace, and emphasizes the steps that workers can take to set
those mechanisms into motion. Its purpose is three-fold:
· to examine the utility of existing legislation designed to provide
technical control of reproductive hazards;
· to describe other legal means, both public and private, for preven-
tive action; and
· to address compensatory remedies, and examine the extent to which
they provide incentives for prevention.
While this article neither exhaustively compiles all available avenues
for relief, nor explores in detail all technical aspects of the remedies
discussed, it does set forth a broad, practical framework designed to
protect reproductive health and future generations from the hazards of
workplace exposures.
II
THE NATURE OF REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS AND THEIR
EFFECTS
Those interested in preventing exposures to reproductive hazards
must have a working knowledge of the kinds of hazards which may be
present in the workplace. This not only will be important for those
who wish to develop a comprehensive control policy, but also workers
who wish to take action in response to their own exposure to reproduc-
tive hazards. Use of the available regulatory or legal mechanisms to
secure abatement of a workplace hazard or to seek compensation for
damage caused by past exposure requires the ability to identify the haz-
ard and its specific effects. This information will influence the choice of
the remedy or control option to be pursued and the manner in which
the claim is presented.
A. Classfication of Reproductive Hazards
For the purposes of this analysis, a workplace "reproductive haz-
ard" is any worker exposure that is capable of (a) harming the fetus or
prospective child of the exposed worker and/or (b) harming the repro-
ductive system or sexual capacity of the exposed worker.' In general,
the former can be divided into three categories. Fetal toxins, such as
1. This definition of "reproductive hazard" thus does not cover the transmission of a toxic
substance from an exposed worker to his or her children after the children are born, as where an
exposed worker brings home toxic particles that remain on his or her clothing, or where a nursing
child is exposed to toxins through the milk of his or her exposed mother.
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lead,2 act during pregnancy by passing through the placental barrier
and poisoning the fetus, and can cause spontaneous abortion, stillbirth.
and various neonatal deficiencies. Teratogens also act during preg-
nancy by passing through the placenta to the fetus, or by altering the
physiology of the mother and affecting the fetus without passing
through the placental barrier. Rather than "poisoning" the fetus, how-
ever, they retard or alter fetal development, and can thus damage the
offspring in a number of ways, including deformity, disease, and death.
Methylmercury is a common example.3 Germ cell mutagens change the
genetic structure of a parent's reproductive cell and can also cause de-
formity, disease, and death. Worker exposure to anesthetic gas, for ex-
ample, has been linked to dominant lethal mutation.4
The interrelationship of these three categories of reproductive haz-
ard is presently under study. In general, while teratogenic agents are
usually thought to be fetotoxic as well, not all fetotoxic agents appear
to be teratogenic. 5 Teratogenic effects are largely thought to be limited
to one generation, and children suffering the effects of teratogenesis are
usually thought to expect no greater incidence of anomalies in their
children than in the general population. 6 More recent evidence, how-
ever, indicates that certain classic teratogens such as thalidomide may
also be mutagens.7 If this is the case, then persons exposed to ter-
atogens in utero may also expect a general increase in mutations among
their offspring. As there has not yet been a comprehensive attempt to
correlate teratogenic and mutagenic effects, it is difficult at present to
determine the extent to which teratogens may also be mutagens. or to
which mutagens may also be teratogens. But both are clearly capable
of causing "birth defects." Further, both may be capable of causing
2. See. e.g., Kurzel and Cetrulo, The Effect of Environmental Pollutants on Human Repro-
duction, Including Birth Defects. 15 ENvtL. Sci. & TECH. 626. 635-36 1981), and the sources cited
therein.
3. See, e.g., id. at 634-35, and the sources cited therein. For a general discussion of terato-
genesis, see J. WILSON & F. FRASER, HANDBOOK OF TERATOLOGY (i197-78).
4. Cohen, A Survey ofAnesthetic Health Hazards Among Dentists. 90 J. AM. DENTAL A.
1291 (1975). But see Knill-Jones, Newman & Spence, Anesthetic Practice and Pregnancr, 1975
LANCET 807.
5. Kurzel and Cetrulo, supra note 2, at 628.
6. See, e.g., Harbison, Teratogens. in CASARETT & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCI-
ENCE OF POISONS 158, 167 (2d ed. 1980): "Most congenital malformations are not associated with
any obvious abnormality of the chromosomes and are not heritable."
7. Thalidomide was introduced into the European market as a sedative in the late 1950's.
Shortly thereafter, an association was detected between thalidomide ingestion in pregnant women
and the occurrence of phocomelia (shortenmng or absence of limbs) among the resultant offspring.
Although the drug was removed from the market in 1961, an estimated 10,000 children were
ultimately deformed by thalidomide. See Harbison, supra note 6. at 169. A recent study suggests
not only that thalidomide may be a mutagen, but also that its teratogenic mechanism may be
mutagenic in nature. Gordon, Thalidomide Teratogenesis. Evidencefor a Toxic Arene Oxide Me-
tabolite, 78 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 2445 (1981).
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irreversible damage through only brief exposure.'
In addition to mutagens and teratogens, a number of hazards can
affect reproductive health without necessarily endangering the off-
spring. Gametotoxins, for example, can impair fertility by damaging or
reducing the number of sperm or ova. Other substances can upset male
or female hormonal balance, thereby reducing sperm or ova produc-
tion. Finally, some hazards cause reduction or loss of sexual function,
through a decrease either in sexual desire or in male potency. While it
is beyond the scope of this article to review the scientific data on repro-
ductive hazards, this information may be obtained from a variety of
excellent sources. 9
B. Damagesfrom Exposure to Reproductive Hazards
A parent or child may suffer specific damage in a variety of ways
from the different general hazards discussed above. For affected work-
ers or their families, the ability to pursue the appropriate claim for le-
gal or regulatory relief will depend on the capacity to differentiate
among these various categories of damage. They must be able to
clearly identify who is or will be injured, and what kinds of injuries
have been or are likely to be incurred.
1. The Offspring
The offspring of an exposed worker will suffer the most serious
8. As the process of mutagenesis may begin with only one cell, a one-time exposure to any
germ-cell mutagen. including a teratogenic mutagen. may be sufficient to induce mutations. In the
great majority of circumstances. of course, mutagenesis will not be induced by only one or a few
exposures. However, any worker who is exposed risks genetic damage. In addition, depending on
a number of factors (such as the stage of embryonic or fetal development and the route of mater-
nal exposure), a non-mutagenic teratogen may induce birth defects with only limited maternal
exposure. As noted by Harbison, "fetal defects [may be] easily produced without harm to the
mother." Harbison. supra note 6, at 164.
9. For a comprehensive, well-referenced and relatively up-to-date compilation of much of
the available information on reproductive hazards, see Clement Associates. Inc.. Chemical
Iazaords to Human Reproduction, COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY (1981). For a less
technical discussion of the relationship between workplace toxins and reproductive injury, see
COALITION FOR THE REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS OF WOMEN (CRROW). REPRODUCTIVE HAZARDS
IN THE WORKPLACE: A RESOURCE GUIDE, chs. 1-3 (1980). For a recent book by a non-scientist,
see C. NORWOOD, AT HIGHEST RISK: ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS TO YOUNG AND UNBORN
CHILDREN (1980). While perhaps not always even-handed or accurate in its interpretation of
scientific evidence, the book gives an indication of the personal dimension of human damage from
reproductive hazards.
For a discussion of the relevant evaluation methodology. see U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC-
TION AGENCY, ASSESSMENT OF RISKS TO HUMAN REPRODUCTION AND TO DEVELOPMENT OF THE
HUMAN CONCEPTUS FROM EXPOSURE TO ENVIRONMENTAL SUBSTANCES (1981). Finally, union
members now have access to data on toxic substances through a computerized information system.
This service is available through The Workers' Institute for Safety and Health, 1126 16th St.,
N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, (202)887-1987. See also Cohen, Hazardous Material Infbrmation
Resources. in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 15 (1983).
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damage from reproductive hazards. When one or both parents are ex-
posed to a workplace reproductive hazard prior to conception. or a
mother is exposed during pregnancy, the child may incur an array of
injuries as the result of that exposure. In the prenatal stage, the fetus
may abort or be stillborn. For example, an increased risk of involun-
tary abortion or stillbirth resulting from maternal exposure to lead has
long been recognized.' ° If the child survives the pregnancy, a parent's
past exposure to a reproductive hazard may cause premature birth or
reduced birth weight. Many workplace substances, including lead, for-
maldehyde, and anesthetic gases have been associated with one or the
other of these outcomes." Moreover, exposure to a mutagen or a ter-
atogen may cause physical or mental deformities. These deformities
may be obvious, or they may be "hidden," not becoming manifest until
later in life. Similarly, a child may be born with a chronic or crippling
disease, or a latent disease with symptoms that do not appear for many
years. For example, many daughters of women who were exposed to
diethylstilbestoral (DES) during pregnancy are developing cancer as
they enter womanhood.' 2 In addition, a parent's exposure can cause
damage to his or her child's immune system or other physiological de-
fense mechanisms, resulting in increased susceptibility to diseases unre-
lated to the exposure.
In conjunction with any one of these physical injuries the child
may also suffer serious emotional damage. Children born with obvious
physical deformities often suffer mental and emotional anguish as they
struggle to transcend the limitations imposed by their hardships.' 3 A
different kind of anguish may be experienced by children, such as the
daughters of DES mothers, who live knowing that they might develop
a devastating disease as a result of their parents' past exposure.
A final category of damage to the offspring is that which results
from the inheritance of chromosomal aberrations. Genetic mutations
can be transmitted through generations. While some germ cell
mutagens will cause readily apparent changes in the child of an ex-
posed parent, others may not cause obvious deformities until future
generations.' 4 Thus, not only may the full consequences of mutagenic
10. Clement Associates, Inc., supra note 9, at IV-25.
11. d. at IV-20 to IV-22.
12. Kurzel & Certrulo, supra note 9. at 630 n.l.
13. For three recent treatments of this topic, see Friedrich & Friedrich. Psychological .4spects
gf Handicapped and Nonhandicapped Children, 85 AM. J. MENTAL DEFICIENCIES 551 (1981):
Lussier. The Physical Handicap and the Body Ego, 61 INT'L J. PSYCHOANALYSIS 117a (1980);
Steams. Understanding the Psychological Adjustment of Phvsicallv Handicapped Children in the
Classroom, 10 CHILD TODAY 12 (1981).
14. Ionizing radiation, for example, is known to be a germ-cell mutagen in animals. See
Hobbs & McClellan, Radiation and Radioactive Materials, in CASARETT & DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY:
THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 497 (2d ed., 1980): "[Radiation-induced] mutations may be dom-
_ _I  LI_ _ _ __
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exposure not be felt until the birth of the grandchildren or great-
grandchildren, but the child of an exposed parent must choose whether
or not to risk those consequences by having children.
2. The Parents
Apart from injury to their offspring, workers themselves may be
subject to various types of reproductive damage. Disruption of normal
ovulation or sperm production and even full sterility are possible. Ex-
posure to 1, 2-dibromo-3-chloropropane (DBCP), lead, and ethylene
dibromide, for example, have all been reported to reduce fertility in
men,' 5 while exposure to various organochlorine pesticides has been
associated with impaired fertility in women.' 6 Reduced reproductive
capacity can also be caused by disruption of sexual desire or sexual
function, as in the cases of male exposure to kepone and carbon disul-
fide'7 and female exposure to various pesticides.' 8 Reproductive
hazards may also make workers less willing to conceive. For example,
they may not wish to take the risks associated with exposure to
mutagens or teratogens. Or a mother may decide not to conceive again
after an involuntary abortion or stillbirth for fear of risking physical
damage from future pregnancies.
A second category of damage common to both parents is the
mental trauma they might suffer as the result of exposure to reproduc-
tive hazards. A man or a woman exposed to mutagenic or teratogenic
substances must often live with the knowledge that his or her future
children may be born with birth defects. Such knowledge could lead to
emotional disorders or even psychoses, and may contribute to marital
strife and divorce. This type of damage may be particularly severe
when the exposure to reproductive hazards is discovered by the mother
during pregnancy, and could possibly lead to miscarriage or voluntary
abortion.
A third category of damage common to both parents involves the
inant, recessive, or sex-linked recessive. Recessive mutations may require numerous generations
prior to their expression." /d at 513.
15. Clement Associates, Inc., supra note 9, at IV-20. See also Woolhandler, Toxic Injury to
Male Reproductive Systems. A Review, in OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY 24 (1983).
16. Clement Associates, Inc., supra note 9, at IV-22.
17. Id at IV-20.
18. Id at IV-22.
19. Evidence of the probable mental and emotional effects of potential reproductive damage
can be found in a number of sources. For studies detailing the psychological impact suffered by
parents of children who have birth defects, see Friedrich & Friedrich, supra note 13 Taylor, Coun-
se/ing the Parents of Handicapped Children, 284 BIUT. MED. J. 1027 (1982). As Taylor notes, these
parents are confronted with a profound sense of failure of their reproductive expectations. A
recent study also indicates substantial psychological reaction to the possibility of having passed on
toxic effects to one's offspring. See Hatcher, The Psychological Experience in Nursing Mothers
Upon Learning ofa Toxic Substance in Their Breast Milk, 45 PSYCHIATRY 172 (1982).
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loss of a child as a result of exposure to a workplace hazard. In addi-
tion to emotional trauma, the damages here will involve a loss of com-
panionship and a possible hesitancy to have more children. A related
injury occurs to the spouse of a worker whose exposure to a reproduc-
tive hazard causes decreased sexual desire or function, or decreased
reproductive capacity. The resultant lack of consortium might lead to
emotional trauma, marital discord, and divorce.
Finally, a woman who is exposed to a reproductive hazard during
pregnancy may suffer physical damage apart from any damage to her
reproductive capacity. A miscarriage, for example, always involves the
risk of serious damage to the mother. And if the fetus dies without
aborting, the mother can suffer fatal hemorrhaging.
The human risks posed by reproductive hazards in the workplace
are both serious and far-reaching. An effective control strategy, then.
must be one that emphasizes prevention. In many cases, the most read-
ily available mechanisms for preventive relief will be those created by
federal statute. In other instances, private actions may be required.20
III
LEGISLATIVE AVENUES FOR PROTECTIVE RELIEF
Exposure to reproductive hazards may be deterred through the use
of federal regulatory control mechanisms and "self-help" remedies cre-
ated by federal statute. Whether existing federal statutory remedies
will be effective in abating reproductive hazards will depend, of course,
on the circumstances of each case. Some general advantages and dis-
advantages, however, can be identified at the outset. On the positive
side, a regulatory statute offers an articulated federal policy of protec-
tion and the expertise and resources of a specialized federal agency.
Quite often, statutory mechanisms require a smaller investment of per-
sonal resources than does a private legal action. 2' In addition, the stat-
utory mechanism sometimes offers a means for recoupment of
attorneys' fees and other personal costs.22 On the negative side, the
statutory process can be slow, and may provide an inadequate rem-
20. This article does not discuss the remedies that may be available under the various state
statutes. In many situations, however, state legislation will provide complementary avenues of
relief, and may in some cases provide relief beyond that which is available under federal statutes.
21. Where the agency response is sufficient one may be able to rely substantially on the
agency's resources. Legal fees, expert witness fees, and other costs usually associated with litiga-
tion can be minimized or avoided. However, where the agency fails to act, or responds insuffi-
ciently, substantial personal expense may be necessary to secure appropriate agency action. In
other situations. such as claims for discriminatory action under section I I of the OSH Act. the
regulatory statute specifically provides for legal representation of the claimant worker at govern-
ment expense. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (1976).
22. See infra notes 73 and 101.
- -I I
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edy.23 Further, citizen participants in the regulatory process may find
that their interests are subordinated to the interests of the regulatory
agency.
A. Regulatory Control of Hazards
There are two comprehensive federal statutes addressing the prob-
lem of reproductive hazards in the workplace. The Occupational
Safety and Health Act (OSH Act)24 is designed to prevent exposure to
workplace hazards in general. Its principal focus is the protection of
the worker, and not the protection his or her offspring. On the other
hand, the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)25 regulates the general
production and use of chemical substances. Its mechanisms clearly can
be utilized on behalf of both parents and offspring.
1. The Occupational Safety & Health Act
The OSH Act provides a potentially useful means of controlling
reproductive hazards in the workplace. The Act contains two general
regulatory provisions for the control of workplace hazards. One is the
standard-setting procedure of section 6(b),26 and the other is the gen-
eral duty provision of section 5(a)(1).27 As both provisions place the
principal responsibility for workplace health and safety on the em-
ployer, they provide mechanisms designed to encourage employers to
abate reproductive hazards before they inflict damage on workers.
a. Occupational Health Standards
Under section 6(b), the Secretary of Labor is responsible for set-
ting new permanent health and safety standards for the workplace.
The statutory description of this responsibility suggests that it can be
used to develop standards which reduce reproductive hazards:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials
or harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard
23. Injunctive relief through the judicial process, where available. may provide a more
timely abatement of a workplace hazard than statutory standard-setting procedures. Further, in
most cases, statutory mechanisms will not provide compensatory relief for damages already suf-
fered. Finally, although generalizations are difficult, the regulatory process is perhaps more sus-
ceptible to political pressures than is the judicial system, and the results are likely to reflect this
fact.
24. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
25. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
26. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). For debate on OSHA's use of the general duty clause, see
Morgan & Duvall, OSHA s General Duty Clause. An Analysris of Its Use andAbuse, 5 INDUS. REL.
L.J. 283 (1983), Drapkin, OSHA s General Duty Clause.' Its Use Is Not Abuse-A Response to
Morgan & Duvall, 5 INDUS. REL. L.J. 322 (1983), and Morgan & Duvall, Reply to Drapkin, 5
INDUS. REL. L.J. 334 (1983).
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which most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of
the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material impair-
ment of health orfunctional capacity even if such employee has regular
exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period of his
working life.28
To the extent that they pose a danger to the health or functional capac-
ity of the exposed worker--or, perhaps, to that worker's future off-
spring-reproductive hazards are a proper subject for standard setting
under section 6(b).
Physical injuries are certainly within the scope of this provision.
Impairment of reproductive or sexual capacity by mutagens or other
toxic substances, for example, clearly constitutes a "material impair-
ment of. . . functional capacity." Similarly, damage to a pregnant
mother as a result of her fetus' exposure to a teratogen is a "material
impairment" of the mother's "health." Further, although OSHA regu-
lations have not yet been extended to the prevention of other than
physical damage, section 6(b) would appear to envisage the regulation
of reproductive hazards that cause mental or emotional injury to the
worker-parent. For while the OSH Act was not designed to produce a
trauma-free workplace, it was intended to reduce the health risks posed
by physically harmful hazards. The mental health dangers imposed by
a worker's physical exposure to teratogens or germ cell mutagens are
no less a material impairment of health than a number of physical im-
pairments-such as hearing loss-for which regulations presently ex-
ist,29 and should be given consideration in devising appropriate control
mechanisms for reproductive hazards.3 0 Finally, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has indicated that the
28. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b) (1976) (emphasis added). Section 6(c) provides for the imposition of
an "emergency temporary standard" while the standard setting process of 6(b) is underway:
The Secretary shall provide, without regard to the requirements of chapter 5. title 5.
United States Code, for an emergency temporary standard to take immediate effect upon
publication in the Federal Register if he determines A) that employees are exposed to
grave danger from exposure to substances or agents determined to be toxic or physically
harmful or from new hazards, and (B) that such emergency standard is necessary to
protect employees from such danger.
29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976). Section 13, 29 U.S.C. § 662 (1976), permits the Secretary to seek imme-
diate injunctive relief in a federal district court against an "imminent danger." Finally, agricul-
tural workers may find additional relief under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136v (1978), which is administered by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency. Where OSH Act and FIFRA regulations overlap, FIFRA will control.
29. The occupational noise level standard is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.95 (1982).
30. The courts have long recognized the fact that mental and emotional trauma can grow out
of physical injury, and have allowed recovery for damages for such trauma in both tort and
worker compensation actions. See Miller, Recoveryfor Psvchic Injuries under Workers' Compensa-
tion, CASE & COM. Sep.-Oct. 1982. at 40. for a recent discussion of this topic. There is no reason
to believe that Congress was unaware of this precedent when it passed the OSH Act, and there is
nothing in the language of Section 6(b) to indicate a limitation to purely physical consequences of
workplace exposures.
_ r -"T--r
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health of future worker offspring must be considered in the setting of
OSH Act standards. 3 '
The Secretary's authority to regulate reproductive hazards is quite
broad. So long as he or she pursues the goal of securing a safe and
healthful workplace environment, the Secretary may embrace a variety
of regulatory alternatives in setting workplace standards. Indeed, as
noted by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia: "A number of the terms of the statute give OSHA almost unlim-
ited discretion to devise means to achieve [this] Congressionally
mandated goal."32 Thus, in addition to devising standards that actu-
ally reduce workplace exposure levels-such as source limits, process
changes, and protective clothing requirements-the Secretary may de-
velop other regulations to promote employee health.
A mechanism which may prove useful in the regulation of repro-
ductive hazards is medical removal protection (MRP). In essence,
MRP involves the relocation of employees who are particularly suscep-
tible to a hazardous exposure to another work area within the plant
where the hazard is not present. MRP can also involve a layoff with
pay.33 The D.C. Circuit has approved an MRP program for lead expo-
sure as a valid exercise of the Secretary's authority under section 6(b), 34
and the concept may well be appropriate for the protection of workers
who prove to be particularly susceptible to damage from reproductive
hazards. MRP programs would be sensible, however, only where their
cost is exceeded by the cost of actually removing the reproductive haz-
ard from the workplace. When properly utilized, MRP programs ap-
31. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia recently indicated that both "work-
ers" and "the children they will hereafter conceive" must be given consideration in the setting of
permanent and temporary standards under the OSH Act. Public Citizen v. Auchter. 702 F.2d
1150 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (proceedings to set permanent standard for ethylene oxide). Althoueh it is
not clear whether a reproductive hazard which affects only future offspring is subject to regulation
under the OSH Act, the court may be giving tacit recognition to the emotional damage suffered by
the worker who must face the knowledge that his or her future children may be damaged by a
current workplace exposure.
32. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189. 1230 (D.C. Cir.), cert. aiened,
453 U.S. 913 (1980).
33. A medical removalprotection provision should thus be distinguished from a simple med-
ical removal provision, such as is mandated for vinyl chloride. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1017(k)(5) 1982),
which does not include wage or seniority protections, and from various employee exclusion poli-
cies whereby fertile workers (usually women) are simply removed from their jobs. See inf/a text
accompanying notes 38-47 and 97-114. Current OSHA standards include MRP provisions only
for asbestos, 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1001(d)(2)(iv)(c) (1982) and lead 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025(k) 1982).
OSHA has thus far declined to develop a generic MRP policy.
34. United States Steelworkers ofAm., 647 F.2d 1189. In American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v.
Donovan, 452 U.S. 490 (1981), the Supreme Court invalidated an MRP provision for cotton dust,
noting that OSHA had failed to make a record for the connection between such a provision and a
"safe and healthful work environment." Nonetheless, the court clearly left OSHA free to reinsti-
tute the MRP provision upon proper justification, and noted that such justification "very well
may" exist. Id at 539-40.
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pear capable both of encouraging beneficial job redesign and of
facilitating worker cooperation with programs of periodic biological
monitoring.
b. The General Duty Clause
Recognizing that the section 6(b) standard-setting procedure
would be incapable of addressing all possible hazards in a timely fash-
ion, Congress imposed an affirmative duty on employers to remove se-
rious hazards from the workplace even where such hazards are not the
subject of a specific OSH Act standard. Section 5(a)(1) requires that
each employer "furnish to his employees employment and a place of
employment which are free from recognized hazards that are causing
or are likely to cause death or serious physical harm to his
employees' 35
Protection against reproductive hazards would appear to be in-
cluded within this duty. Section 5(a)(1) was described in a Senate
Committee report to Congress as creating a "general and common duty
to bring no adverse effects to the life and health of. . . employees."36
A recent decision of the Occupational Safety and Health Review Com-
mission (OSHRC) suggests that this duty extends to all recognized
hazards which "alter the physical integrity of employees while they are
engaged in work or work-related activities." 37 A workplace hazard
which impairs the sexual or reproductive process, or which endangers
the health of the mother through damage to her fetus, is an affront to
the physical integrity of the affected worker. The scope of the general
duty clause appears slightly less broad than that of the standard-setting
mechanism of section 6(b). The general duty clause is designed to pre-
vent only serious "physical" harm. Purely emotional damage is thus
beyond its purview.
While the general duty clause requires the employer to provide a
workplace free of "recognized hazards" likely to cause serious physical
harm to his workers, the courts have not yet decided whether the OSH
35. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). See generally Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1973).
36. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9, reprinted in 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5177, 5186 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
37. American Cyanamid Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1596, 1600 (1981). Judicial interpreta-
tions suggest that a "common sense" standard will be employed in determining whether a hazard
poses a "serious" risk. See, e.g., Donovan v. Royal Logging Co., 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 1755, 1761-
62 (9th Cir. 1981) (clause applies when a "reasonably prudent employer" would have known
abatement required); National Realty and Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1265 n.33 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) (one factor to be considered in evaluating the potential for injury is "of course, common
sense."). Workplace concentrations of lead below those permitted by the applicable standard have
been held by the OSHA Review Commission to constitute a "serious" risk of injury under Section
5(a)(l). Asarco, Inc., 8 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) 2076 (1980).
39llR _ 3 - L-l
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Act permits the employer to achieve compliance with the clause by ex-
cluding employees for whom a particular condition poses a hazard.
This is a particularly critical question in the context of reproductive
hazards control. A number of employers have implemented policies
which exclude fertile females-and, in some cases, non-sterilized
males-from jobs involving exposure to certain reproductive hazards.38
Usually instituted in the name of worker protection, employee exclu-
sion policies appear to grow out of a combination of moral and eco-
nomic concerns. While they do provide some protection for future
offspring, the economic benefit of such policies inures largely to the
employer, who avoids the cost of removing the reproductive hazard
from the workplace while at the same time insuring against future tort
liability for damages to the offspring of the exposed workers. To the
extent that they discriminate against female employees, policies of this
nature may violate Title VII of the Federal Civil Rights Act.39
In addition, such policies may also violate the OSH Act. The
American Cyanamid Company imposed a "fetus protection policy" at
its Willow Island, West Virginia plant. Under the policy, female work-
ers of child-bearing age cannot work in the plant's lead pigment de-
partment unless they have been surgically sterilized. "0 Acting on a
worker complaint, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) determined that the policy itself posed a hazard to the repro-
ductive capacity of the affected female workers, and issued a citation
under the general duty clause. The Occupational Safety & Health Re-
view Commission disagreed and vacated the citation. The Review
Commission reasoned that the policy cannot be considered a "hazard"
under the meaning of section 5 because it is "neither a work process
nor a work material" and thus cannot "cause injury or disease by oper-
ating directly upon employees as they engage in work or work-related
activities."4' When OSHA failed to appeal this decision, the union
sought review in the D.C. Circuit, where the case is now pending.4 2
38. Reportedly, employers who have implemented exclusionary policies of this nature in-
clude: Amax. American Cyanamid, Dupont, General Motors, B.F. Goodrich. Olin, Sun Oil, Gulf
Oil. Bunker Hill Smelter. Union Carbide, Allied Chemical, Monsanto. TWA. and Dow Chemical.
The Lead Industries Association is reported to have endorsed this "female exclusion" approach in
1974. J. Bertin. Discriminating Against Women of Child bearing Capacity 2 (January 8. 1982)
(paper presented at The Hastings Center). For a reasoned discussion of some of the social issues
raised by this trend, see Bayer, Women, Work, and Reproductive Hazards, HASTINGS CENTER
REPORT 14 (1982).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 96-113.
40. These facts are taken from the Review Commission decision in American Cyanamid
Co.. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1597.
41. Id at 1600. This was a two-to-one decision, with Commissioner Cottine dissenting.
42. Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers Union, Local 3-499 v. OSHRC, Docket No. 81-1687.
On February 26, 1982, the D.C. Circuit denied American Cyanamid's motion to dismiss, but held
that the American Cyanamid Co., and not OSHRC, was the proper defendant. 671 F.2d 643
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Whether or not one views the Review Commission's decision as
correct depends in large part on the vantage point from which one
views the "fetus protection" policy. From the employer's perspective, it
is possible to conclude that the policy has no impact on a worker's re-
productive capacity, as it does not require anyone to seek sterilization.
This was the position taken by the Review Commission, which noted
that it is "impossible for an employer literally to compel employees to
undergo sterilization."4 3 To the female employee, however, the policy
presents the kind of Hobson's choice which is tantamount to compul-
sion: she must sacrifice either her job or her ability to bear children.
Its effect is to encourage the sterilization of female workers.
A careful reading of the OSH Act and its legislative history indi-
cates that the policy should be viewed from the employee's perspective.
The OSH Act was designed to make the workplace safe for the worker,
and not to make the worker safe for the workplace. It carries with it an
underlying directive that the employer, not the employee, bear the
principal responsibility for workplace safety.4 4 As American Cyana-
mid's female-exclusion policy shifts that burden to the employee, it
would appear to violate the OSH Act. Further, the policy's discrimina-
tory nature appears to conflict with section 2(b) of the Act, which ex-
presses the congressional purpose "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working
conditions,"4 5 and with section 6(b)(5), which requires OSHA stan-
dards to insure that "no employee will suffer material impairment of
health."'4 If an employer truly desires to implement a "fetus protection
policy," he can either take the steps necessary to remove reproductive
hazards from the workplace, or institute job reassignment/wage reten-
tion programs which protect the fetus without sacrificing the mother.47
c. Implementation and Enforcement
So far, reproductive hazards have been given little attention under
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. American Cyanimid Co. v. Oil, Chemical, & Atomic Workers
Union, Local 3-499, 12 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 391 (1982).
43. 9 O.S.H. Cas. (BNA) at 1599 n.14.
44. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 36. at 9: "Employers have primary control of the work
environment and should insure that it is safe and healthful."
45. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976) (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia has noted in dicta that "fertile women can find statutory protection from such discrimi-
nation in the OSH Act's own requirement that OSHA standards ensure that 'no employee will
suffer material impairment of health' .. ." United Steelworkers. 647 F.2d at 1238 n. 74.
47. To avoid or mitigate an adverse economic impact, employees can restructure job assign-
ments and, in the long run, incorporate process changes that reduce or eliminate the harmful
exposures. Nonetheless, the OSH Act clearly does anticipate that OSHA standards may result in
economic loss to some employers. and may even result in plant closings. See Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F 2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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the OSH Act. To be sure, workplace exposure to DBCP has been regu-
lated primarily because of its danger as a reproductive hazard. 4 8 Fur-
ther, while compliance with the permissible exposure level for lead will
not ensure against reproductive damage,4 9 the lead standard does in-
clude an MRP provision intended to protect both male and female
workers from reproductive effects.50 Most reproductive toxins, how-
ever, have thus far escaped regulation under either Section 6(b) or the
general duty clause.
One difficulty in regulating reproductive hazards under the OSH
Act is the frequent lack of conclusive evidence that a particular sub-
stance causes a particular reproductive injury. The precise human ef-
fects of many known or suspected mutagens and teratogens may be
especially difficult to discern. A degree of uncertainty is almost always
a part of the regulatory process, however, and was certainly present in
the development of standards for the carcinogens and other toxins
which are currently regulated under the OSH Act. Persuasive animal
carcinogenicity, even in the absence of confirmatory epidemiological
evidence, has been deemed sufficient to regulate a substance as a poten-
tial human carcinogen.' Indeed, under OSHA's generic cancer policy,
"suspect carcinogens" are subject to regulation.5 2
The OSH Act does not require certainty. Under section 6(b), the
Secretary must show that it is more likely than not that a hazard
presents a risk of material impairment before it may be subjected to
regulation. Interpreting this section in light of Section 3(8) of the Act,
the Supreme Court has added the requirement that the probable risk of
48. The standard for DBCP is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1044 (1982). Appendix A to this
regulation, at § II.B.2, notes: "Prolonged or repeated exposure to DBCP has been shown to cause
sterility in humans."
49. The lead standard is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1982), with a specific discussion of
reproductive effects at Appendix C, § II.5. The inclusion of an MRP provision intended to pro-
tect, inter alia. against reproductive damage is a clear acknowledgment that such damage can
occur under the permissible exposure levels.
50. The medical removal protection provision is found at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1029 (1982). Al-
though the automatic removal provisions (based on particular blood lead concentrations) will not
necessarily protect against reproductive damage, the general removal provisions are applicable:
"temporary medical removal may in particular cases be needed for workers desiring to parent a
child in the near future or for particular pregnant employees. Some males may need a temporary
removal so that their sperm can regain sufficient viability for fertilization .. ."
51. See generally Industrial Union Dep't v. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 657 n.64 (1980)
(benzene); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1150 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975) (ethylenzamine).
52. See 29 C.F.R § 1990 (1982). In light of Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980), and current Administration policy, the ultimate fate of the
generic cancer standard is in doubt. See, e.g., Proposed Changes in Cancer Policy Withdrawn by
Reagan Administration, 10 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1387 (1981); OSHA Proposes Changes in Policy to
Reflect Ruling in Benzene Decision, 10 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 1097 (1981); OSHA Asks fifth Circuit to
Delay Cancer Policy Review, Court Agrees, 10 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 795 (1981).
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a hazardous occurrence be "significant." 53 The general duty clause has
been held by six circuits to regulate "reasonably foreseeable" risks.54
While these evidentiary burdens cannot be taken lightly, they are far
from insurmountable.
The problem is not so much scientific certainty as it is emphasis.
OSHA has the flexibility and the statutory mandate to develop mecha-
nisms for legally recognizing potential reproductive hazards and to de-
vise innovative regulatory strategies for reducing those hazards in the
workplace. Opportunities for immediate action exist in both areas.
Various short-term cell tests, such as the Ames assay or the sister chro-
matoid exchange test," may be used to target workplace chemicals for
probable mutagenic effects. Although further research is warranted,
regulation of a number of reproductive hazards could proceed under
the present state of scientific knowledge. 6
Primary authority for the implementation and enforcement of sec-
tions 5(a)(1) and 6(b) rests with OSHA. Workers, however, can do
much to encourage the use of these statutory procedures. In the past,
the impetus for an OSHA action has often come from worker initia-
tives. Employees can encourage implementation of the OSH Act's pro-
visions by supplying information regarding reproductive hazards to
OSHA, by petitioning OSHA for the appropriate formal action under
sections 5(a)(1), 6(b), 6(c), or 13, and, if OSHA fails to act, by filing suit
to compel the Secretary of Labor to fulfill his or her obligations under
the Act.57 A worker contemplating action under the Act, however,
should base such action on potential harm to both affected workers and
53. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 671 (1980).
54. See, e.g., Pratt & Whitney Aircraft v. Secretary of Labor, 649 F.2d 96, 100-01 (2d Cir.
1981) and the cases cited therein.
55. These are in vitro laboratory tests that can be completed in a rather short period of time,
and are thought by many to provide a somewhat reliable indication of whether a chemical is likely
to prove mutagenic (and, by implication, carcinogenic or teratogenic). See generalvy Ames, Identi-fing Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutatwons and Cancer, 204 SCIENCE 587 (1979). and the
references cited therein; Wolff, Sister Chromatoid Exchange, ANN. REV. OF GENETICS 183 (1977).
56. For example. NIOSH has compiled a list of confirmed and suspected teratogens and
mutagens as part of its Registry of the Toxic Effects of Chemical Substances (RTECS). This could
provide an excellent starting point for regulatory action. This volume is periodically updated and
contains references from the scientific and medical literature. The latest edition, dated 1980, is
available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
D.C., under GPO 017-033-00399-8. OSHA has taken the position that there is a "limited state of
awareness" of reproductive hazards, and has therefore declined to adopt a generic policy or stan-
dard for reproductive hazards. See Scientc Data Insufficient for OSHA to Issue Generic Rule,
Vance Testifes, 12 O.S.H. REP. (BNA) 204 (1982).
57. Section 13(d) provides a specific right of mandamus where the Secretary "arbitrarily or
capriciously fails to seek relief' under the "imminent danger" provision of that section. 29 U.S.C.
§ 662(d) (1976). Review of an agency's decision not to act on a particular hazard can generally be
secured under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 704, 706 (1976).
Further, a limitd right to what is essentially a mandamus action is available under § 702 of the
APA, which provides for relief against "an agency or an officer or employee thereof [that] acted or
-----I---- -- ICI -- 
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their offspring, rather than to offspring alone. In most cases this will be
largely a matter of emphasis, and need not meaningfully limit the re-
productive hazards subject to OSH Act regulation. As discussed above,
most reproductive hazards which harm the child also harm the exposed
parent, either through physical or emotional injury.58
The OSH Act does not provide for a recovery of attorneys' fees by
worker participants. However, as discussed below, it does protect
workers from retaliation by the employer for the exercise of their rights
under the Act.59
2. The Toxic Substances Control Act
Regulation of reproductive hazards in the workplace may also be
pursued through the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA).60 TSCA
contemplates a two-tiered approach to the control of chemical toxins.
It provides a mechanism for the systematic testing of potential toxins to
determine whether they present a risk of injury to human health or the
environment, and further provides a means to control the production
or use of those substances which present an "unreasonable" risk of
such injury. Congress intended that TSCA be used to regulate repro-
ductive hazards. Section 4(b)(2)(A) is specific:
The health and environmental effects for which standards for the devel-
opment of test data may be prescribed include ... mutagenesis, terato-
genesis, behavioral disorders . . . and any other effect which may
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment.6 1
Under TSCA, a manufacturer is responsible for testing the poten-
tially dangerous chemical substances it produces.6 2 For a chemical ac-
tually in use, section 4(a) requires testing where that chemical "may
present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environment,"
or where the chemical is produced in substantial quantities and either
"may reasonably be anticipated to enter the environment in substantial
quantities" or "there . . . may be significant or substantial human ex-
posure."63 Section 5 imposes similar requirements for new chemicals,
and for existing chemicals put to significant new uses. Here, however,
additional safeguards exist, as such production or new use may not be-
failed to act in an official capacity or under color of legal authority." 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976) (em-
phasis added).
58. See supra text accompanying notes 15-20 and the material cited therein. Lead, for exam-
ple, is both a fetal toxin that can harm potential offspring and a sterilant that can cause reduced
fertility in males.
59. See infra text accompanying notes 76-95.
60. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(2)(A) (1976).
62. Section 4(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(b)(3)(B) (1976).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1976) (emphasis added).
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gin until ninety days after all required testing is completed.6 4
The purpose of this testing requirement is to provide the necessary
data for determining whether regulation of a production or use is ap-
propriate. Responsibility for the development of such regulations, and
the enforcement of the Act in general, rests principally with the Admin-
istrator of the Environmental Protection Agency. The Administrator
may impose a temporary production or use standard, pending required
testing, under sections 5(e) and (f),65 file action in Federal District
Court to enjoin the production or use of an "imminent hazard" under
section 7,66 or impose permanent standards on production or use under
section 6.67 For toxic substances generally, the Administrator must de-
velop a permanent standard or take other decisive action if there is "a
reasonable basis to conclude" that a substance poses an "unreasonable
risk to health or the environment." 68
For carcinogens, mutagens or teratogens, the Administrator is
given a more specific statutory directive. Section 4(f) provides that
whenever there is information
which indicates to the Administrator that there may be a reasonable
basis to conclude that a chemical substance or mixture presents or will
present a significant risk of serious or widespread harm to human be-
ings from cancer, gene mutations, or birth defects, the Administrator
shall . . . initiate appropriate action under [section 5, 6, or 7, to pre-
vent or reduce to a sufficient extent such risk or publish in the Federal
Register a finding that such risk is not unreasonable. 69
Section 9 of TSCA requires EPA to report findings under section 4(f) to
OSHA for appropriate action, but does not affect EPA's authority to
regulate the suspect chemical itself.70
This section potentially provides an excellent mechanism for the
control of many serious reproductive hazards. To date, however, EPA
has not invoked the provisions of section 4(f) for any suspected ter-
atogen or mutagen. This appears to be a failure to fulfill a direct statu-
tory mandate. While the language of section 4(f) arguably allows the
Administrator a degree of discretion in determining whether a sub-
stance poses a significant risk, it also clearly anticipates that the Ad-
64. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1976).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 2604(e), (f) (1976).
66. 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1976).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (1976). For a general discussion of § 6(e), see Environmental Defense
Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 636 F.2d 1267 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For a discussion of
the exemption provisions of § 6, see SED, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 519 F. Supp. 979 (D. Ohio 1981).
One court has held that this section does not create a private right of action for damages. Johnson
v. Koppers Co., 524 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Ohio 1981).
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2604(f), 2605(a) (1976).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 2603(f) (1976) (emphasis added).
70. 15 U.S.C. § 2608 (1976).
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ministrator will take regulatory action in the face of scientific
uncertainty. Section 4(f) requires some action whenever there "may"
be a reasonable basis to conclude that a significant risk exists. Cer-
tainly, a number of teratogens and mutagens are eligible for considera-
tion on this basis.
Here again, workers can prompt regulatory action. Citizen peti-
tions for the issuance or amendment of production, use, or testing stan-
dards are specifically authorized by section 21 of TSCA," and citizens'
suits to compel the Administrator to take non-discretionary action
under the Act are authorized by section 20.72 Further, the award of
attorneys' fees and costs to citizen participants is authorized, but not
required, in many sections of the Act,73 and section 23 protects workers
from retaliation for their assertion of rights under the Act.74
We may soon learn more about the extent to which citizen in-
volvement can motivate regulatory action against reproductive hazards
under TSCA. The EPA recently declined to regulate formaldehyde as
a potential carcinogen under section 4(f). Suit is being contemplated to
compel the Administration to proceed with such regulations.'5 The
outcome of such litigation might well determine how useful 4(f) will be
as a regulatory tool against teratogens and mutagens.
B. Statutory Sef-Help Mechanisms
In addition to general regulatory controls, federal statutes also
provide workers with avenues for individual relief. For reproductive-
hazard control, the two most valuable statutory "self-help" mecha-
nisms are the right to refuse hazardous work and the right to be free of
sexual discrimination in the workplace.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 2620 (1976). For a discussion of the proper forum for review under this
section, see Environmental Defense Fund v. Environmental Protection Agency, 636 F.2d at 1273-
74.
72. 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (1976). A county has been held to lack standing under this section.
Warren County v. State of North Carolina. 528 F. Supp. 276 (D.N.C. 1981).
73. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2605(c)(4)(A). 2618(d), 2619(c)(2), and 2620(b)(4)(C) (1976). For a detailed
discussion of the award of attorneys fees under TSCA. see Environmental Defense Fund v. Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, 672 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
74. 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1976). The 30-day time limit for filing a complaint under this section
has been held not to be jurisdictional. School Dist. of Allentown v. Marshall, 657 F.2d 16 (3d Cir.
1981).
75. Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Government Operations. 97th Cong.,
1st Sess. 185, 191 (1981).
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1. The Right to Refuse Hazardous Work76
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)77 and the OSH Act78
provide many employees a limited right to refuse to perform hazardous
work.7 9 When properly exercised, this right protects an employee from
retaliatory discharge or other discriminatory action for refusing haz-
ardous work, and incorporates a remedy providing both reinstatement
and back pay. The nature of this right under the NLRA depends on
the relevant collective bargaining agreement, if there is one. Non-
union employees, and union employees whose collective bargaining
agreements specifically exclude health and safety from a no-strike
clause, have the right to stage a safety walkout under section 7 of the
NLRA.80 If they choose to walk out based on a good faith belief that
working conditions are unsafe, they will be protected from retaliation
by their employer. 8 ' Union employees who are subject to a comprehen-
sive collective bargaining agreement may avail themselves to the provi-
sions of section 502 of the NLRA.82 Under this section, an employee
who is faced with "abnormally dangerous conditions" has an individ-
ual right to leave the job site. The right may be exercised, however,
only where the existence of abnormally dangerous conditions can be
objectively verified.83
Under a 1973 OSHA regulation, the right to refuse hazardous
work extends to all employees of private employers, regardless of the
existence or nature of a collective bargaining agreement. The scope of
this right, however, is not yet clear. Section I (c) of the OSH Act pro-
tects an employee from discharge or other retaliatory action arising out
76. For a detailed discussion of the right to refuse hazardous.work, see Ashford & Katz,
Unsafe Working Conditions. Emplo)ee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the
Occupational Safety & Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 802 (1977): Atelson, Threats to Health
and Safetv.' Employee Self-Help Under the NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647 ( 1975).
77. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
79. Some employees, e.g., agricultural workers and workers covered by the Railway Labor
Act, are not covered by the NLRA. The OSH Act does cover agricultural workers. This article
does not discuss rights to refuse hazardous work other than those available under the NLRL- and
OSH Act. The Mine Health and Safety Act, for example, has such a provision, and federal em-
ployees are afforded a right to refuse hazardous work as a matter of policy.
80. 29 U.S.C., § 157 (1977). See, e.g., NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9
(1962).
81. See. e.g., Union Boiler Co. v. NLRB, 530 F.2d 970 (4th Cir. 1975), enforcing 213
N.L.R.B. 818, 87 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1269 (1974). However, a walkout by a minority of employees
in derogation of a position taken by the union in a no-strike clause is not protected under section
7. See, e.g., NLRB v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., 318 F.2d 661 (7th Cir. 1963). For a more detailed
discussion of this issue, see Ashford & Katz, supra note 76, at 803-05.
82. 29 U.S.C., § 143 (1976).
83. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 385-87 (1974). For a more detailed discussion
of this issue, see Ashford & Katz, supra note 76 at 805-18.
___ __ _ _ --··li*-sl-ls-- ---- ---.-- -^---- -
1983] 541
INDUSTRIJAL RELATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 5:523
of his or her "exercise" of "any right" afforded by the Act.84 The Sec-
retary of Labor has promulgated regulations under this section defining
a right to refuse hazardous work in certain circumstances: where an
employee reasonably believes that there is a "real danger of death or
serious injury," there is insufficient time to eliminate that danger
through normal administrative channels, and the employer has failed
to comply with an employee request to correct the situation.8 5 In
Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall,86 this regulation was upheld by the
Supreme Court. A unanimous Court held that the Secretary's action
was authorized by section 1 l(c), and noted that the regulation "simply
permits private employees of private employers to avoid workplace
dangers that they believe pose grave dangers to their own safety." 87
Although not widely used for this purpose, the right to refuse haz-
ardous work provides a limited means of relief for employees facing
reproductive hazards in the workplace.88 An employee who contem-
plates the exercise of one of these three statutory rights should take care
to ensure that his or her workplace situation meets the criteria for such
exercise. The section 7 right is the broadest of the three, as it permits a
subjective determination of workplace danger. As noted, however, it
applies only to certain categories of employees, and contemplates "con-
certed action." This usually means that more than one employee must
be involved, although an individual work stoppage may qualify if it is
intended to serve the interests of other workers.89 Exercise of the sec-
tion 502 right requires an objectively verifiable hazard, and thus does
not protect against retaliation when the employee's subjective determi-
nation proves to have been incorrect. Under section 1 (c) of the OSH
84. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976). That section provides in pertinent part:
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because
such employee has filed any complaint or instituted or caused to be instituted any pro-
ceeding under or related to this chapter or has testified or is about to testify in any such
proceeding or because of the exercise by such employee on behalf of himself or others of
any right afforded by this chapter.
85. 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(b)(2) (1982).
86. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1. 21 (1980).
87. Id
88. The right to refuse hazardous work appears to have been extended to reproductive
hazards in Canada. The Labour Minister recently ruled that a pregnant employee who left her
job because she felt that a hepatitis risk at the workplace posed a danger to her unborn child
properly exercised her right to refuse unsafe working conditions under the Canadian Occupa-
tional Health and Safety Act. The Minister s reported to have ruled that, because "there is no
distinction between a pregnant worker and her unborn child." the fetus may be protected under
the Act even though there is no specific provision for such protection. See ONTARIO FOLUNDATION
OF LABOUR, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY CENTRE. Women Can ReJiuse fFetus in Jeop-
ardv, AT THE SOURCE, (March/April, 1983). For a discussion of the right to refuse hazardous
work in Canada, see Brown, Canadian Occupational Health and Safetyv Legislation. 20 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 90, 96-102 (1982).
89. See NLRB v. Interboro Contractors, Inc.. 388 F.2d 495, 499 (2d Cir. 1967). But see
NLRB v. C & I Air Conditioning, Inc., 486 F.2d 977, 978 (9th Cir. 1973).
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Act, as noted by the Supreme Court, ". . . any employee who acts in
reliance on the regulation runs the risk of discharge or reprimand in the
event a court subsequently finds that he acted unreasonably or in bad
faith."' Here the standard is one of the reasonableness, not the cor-
rectness, of the perception of danger. Proof of the violation of an appli-
cable OSH Act standard or general duty clause citation should provide
at least a partial basis for proof of the existence of a hazard, or of the
reasonableness of the perception of a hazard.91
Moreover, an employee exercising either the NLRA section 502 or
OSH Act right must demonstrate that the danger was sufficiently "haz-
ardous" to warrant such a refusal to work. Proof of an "abnormally
dangerous" condition under section 502 may be particularly difficult in
inherently dangerous jobs, as this section is usually applied only to con-
ditions that are not a "normal" part of the job.92 For this reason, most
reproductive hazards will probably be addressed more easily under the
OSH Act right rather than under section 502. Certainly, reproductive
hazards commonly present a concrete risk of a "serious" injury. The
key question will be whether the hazard presents a real danger of injury
before administrative procedures can be utilized. Hazards such as
germ cell mutagens, which can cause serious and irreversible harm af-
ter only a short-term exposure,93 would appear to meet this criterion.
A final limitation on the right to refuse hazardous work is its un-
certain applicability to injuries to a worker's future offspring. The
OSH Act appears to apply only to hazards affecting the health and
safety of workers. The exercise of this right must be based solely on
potential damage to the worker.94 The applicable language of the
NLRA is not limited to worker health and safety, however, but rather
contains broad protections against discriminatory action and coer-
cion,9 5 and may protect workers who refuse to perform work which is
causing mental distress. Thus, a workplace teratogen may very well
constitute a "dangerous" condition under sections 7 and 502.
2. The Right to Freedom from Sexual Discrimination
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended in 1978,
90. Whirlpool Corp. v. Marshall. 445 U.S. 1, 21 (1980).
91. For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Ashford & Katz. supra note 76. at 831-
35.
92. See id at 806, and the cases cited therein.
93. See supra text accompanying note 8.
94. The regulation creating the right pertains only to situations "when an employee is con-
fronted with a choice between not performing assigned tasks or subjecting himself to serious injury
or death .. ." 29 C.F.R. § 1977.12(6)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
95. Section 7 of the NLRA speaks broadly of the rights of employers to organize for their
"mutual aid orprotection," 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) (emphasis added), and the overall spirit of the
Act is freedom from coercion, both physical and emotional.
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provides in pertinent part that ". . . women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for
all employment-related purposes . . . as other persons not so affected,
but similar in their ability or inability to work . .. 6 This provision,
designed to protect women from sexual discrimination in the work-
place, calls into question the legality of the "fetus protection" policies
discussed above.97 An employer who excludes fertile women from a
workplace because they may become pregnant discriminates against
those women on the basis of their potential to become "affected by
pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions."98 A number of
commentators have argued that such discrimination violates Title
VII.99 This interpretation, if accepted by the courts, could provide fe-
male workers with a valuable tool for addressing workplace hazards. '
An employee who believes she is a victim of sexual discrimination
may petition for relief under the Civil Rights Act. If she is successful,
she will ordinarily 'be entitled to recovery of attorneys' fees and costs, as
well as appropriate redress for the discrimination.'"' There are two
principal defenses to a Title VII action. One is the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification (BFOQ) defense, which requires the employer to
96. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1981). This section. known as the "Pregnancy
Discrimination Act," was a Congressional response to General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125 (1976).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 38-47.
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1976 & Supp. IV 1981).
99. Five somewhat divergent viewpoints, all coming to this same general conclusion. are
represented in Mattson. The Pregnancy Amendment. Fetal Rights and the Workplace 86 CASE &
COM., No. 6, at 33 (1981): Nothstein and Ayres, Sex-Based Considerations of Differentiation in the
Workplace.' Exploring the Biomedical Interface Between OSHA and Title iP7/. 26 VILL. L. REV.
239 (1981); Williams, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus. The Reconciliation of'Fetal Protection
with Employment Opportunitv Goals UCnder itle VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641 (1981): J. Bertin. Discrimi-
nation Against Women of Childbearing Capacity, presented at the Hastings Center (January 8.
1982); Stillman, The Law in Conflict. Accommodating Equal Employment and Occupational Health
Obligations, presented at the American Occupational Health Conference. Anaheim. California
(May 2, 1979). As noted by Ronald Bayer of The Hastings Center, underlying the Title VII furor
over female exclusionary policies is "a recognition that the American economy so limits the pos-
sibilities of its women workers that they would demand, as a sign of liberation, the right to share
with men access to reproductive risks." Bayer, supra note 38, at 19.
100. A circuit court decision that construes the 1978 amendment in the context of a fetal
protection policy is Wright v. Olin Corp.. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). Under Olin's "fetal
vulnerability" policy, all women up to age 63 are assumed to be fertile, and are excluded from
certain jobs which may require exposure to teratogenic or abortofacient agents unless Olin's doc-
tors determine that they cannot bear children. In addition, most pregnant women are excluded
from certain other jobs which involve more limited exposure to these substances. and non-preg-
nant women may work in such jobs only after signing acknowledgments of risk. In reversing the
district court decision in EEOC v. Olin Corp., 24 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1646 (W.D.N.C.
1980), the Fourth Circuit held that "the existence and operation of the fetal vulnerability program
established as a matter of law aprimafacie case of Title VII violation." 697 F.2d at 1187. The
court remanded the case to the district court to allow Olin an opportunity to attempt to demon-
strate that the policy was justified by business necessity. See infra note 107.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976).
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demonstrate that the policy of discrimination was reasonably necessary
both to "the essence of its business" and to the promotion of worker
safety or efficiency. ' 0 2 A "fetus protection" policy thus would require a
,strong showing that women of child-bearing capacity are unable to effi-
ciently and safely perform their jobs. The second defense is based on
business necessity, and requires the employer to demonstrate that the
discriminatory policy is absolutely essential to the continuation of the
business, and that the business cannot be protected through any reason-
able alternative.' 03 Both defenses have been rather narrowly construed
by the courts,' 4 and some commentators have concluded that an em-
ployer seeking to justify a fetal protection policy will have difficulty in
successfully asserting either defense.' 0 5
In the past, the business-necessity defense has been available only
where the policy in question was not discriminatory on its face.' °
Therefore, as discrimination "on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth or
related medical conditions" has been specifically designated as sex dis-
crimination under Title VII, this defense would not appear to be avail-
able where the "fetus protection" policy applies only to fertile women.
Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit has characterized one such policy as
"literally expressed in gender-neutral terms," and has held that busi-
ness necessity, if properly established, is an appropriate defense.' 7
102. The defense arises from statutory language. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976). Princi-
pal cases defining the defense are: Arrit v. GriselL 567 F.2d 1267, 1271 (4th Cir. 1977): User v.
Tamiami Trail Tours. Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 19'6): Hodgson vs. Greyhound Lines. Inc..
499 F.2d 859, 861-63 (7th Cir. 1974). Mattson, supra note 99, at 34, argues that the defense will
not be successful in "fetus protection" cases "unless it can be shown that there is a definite nexus
between pregnancy risks and job performance. as opposed to a potential risk to the fetus."
103. The business-necessity defense was judicially created. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co..
401 U.S. 424. 431 (1971).
104. The Supreme Court has characterized the BFOQ defense as an "extremely narrow ex-
ception" to the prohibition against sex discrimination. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321. 334
(1977). In Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), the Court indicated that the
availability of an alternative policy which would meet the same business necessit "would be
evidence that the employer was using [the challenged policy] merely as a 'pretext' for discrimina-
tion." Id at 425. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.. the Court characterized the business-necessity
test as requiring a "manifest relation to the employment in question." 401 U.S. at 431. See also.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
105. Again, though they do not always agree on particulars, this is the general conclusion
reached by many commentators. See supra note 99.
106. The defense was developed by the Supreme Court in conjunction with the court's recog-
nition that an employment practice that was neutral on its /fce could still violate Title VII if it was
discriminatory in its effect. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. at 431. The defense has not been
extended to facially discriminatory policies.
107. Wright v. Olin Corp.. 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982). In describing Olin's "fetus vulnera-
bility" policy as "gender-neutral," the court appears to have rejected the argument that discrimi-
nation on the basis of childbearing capacity was sex discrimination on itsface, and thus to have
found the policy discriminatory only in its effect. As noted. application of the business-necessity
defense would be consistent with such a determination of facial neutrality. The court indicated
that protection of the fetus was an appropriate business purpose under that defense:
- I ------ ---
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This position conflicts with that taken by some commentators,'08 as
well as with the articulated position of at least one federal district
court,'0 9 and appears inconsistent with the plain language of the Civil
Rights Act."'
One commentator, Wendy W. Williams of Georgetown Univer-
sity, has argued that Title VII will permit fetal protection policies only
if they are applied equally to fertile employees of both sexes."' In-
deed, as discussed previously, scientific evidence suggests that a policy
of isolating fertile women from reproductive hazards without also iso-
lating fertile men is insufficient. A recent report of the Council on En-
vironmental Quality summarizes the available information as follows:
The scientific basis for differential regulation is limited. Reproduction
involves a wider range of processes in females than in males, and some
processes in females involve critical periods of differential develop-
ment. However, it does not necessarily follow that women are more
sensitive to the action of any given agent. Where extensive data have
been compiled on both sexes (e.g., for anesthetic gases and smelter
emissions), evidence has been found for adverse effects resulting from
exposure of both men and women, including some evidence for adverse
fetal effects following exposure of males.' 12
When employers realize that they may face liability as a result of the
. . .we believe the safety of unborn children is . . . appropriately analogized to the
safety of personal service customers of the business ... We cannot believe that Con-
gress meant bv Title VII absolutely to deprive employers of the right to provide any
protection for licensees and invitees legitimately and necessarily upon their premises by
any policy having a disparate impact upon certain workers.
Id at 1189. In setting forth guidelines for cases of this nature. the court indicated that the burden
of establishing the defense is on the employer, that it must be established by independent. objec-
tive evidence, and that it must be supported by the opinion evidence of qualified scientific experts.
The court further indicated that the employer need not show a scientific consensus, but must show
that there is so considerable a body of opinion that (1) significant risk to unborn children exists
and (2) such risk is confined to the exposure of women workers, that an informed employer could
not responsibly fail to act. Finally, the court indicated that the defense. if established. may be
rebutted by proof of acceptable alternative policies or practices.
108. See Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 99. at 306-12; Williams. supra note 99. at 667-78.
109. The Western District of Michigan has offered the following statement of the law: . .
in evaluating employment practices subsequent to [the Pregnancy Discrimination Act], policies
which create distinctions or discriminate on the basis of pregnancy are in violation absent a show-
ing of a bona fide occupational qualification." Thompson v. Board of Education of Romeo Com-
munity Schools, 526 F. Supp. 1035, 1039 (W.D. Mich. 1981).
110. Although the rather direct language of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act would appear
to be central to any analysis of the treatment of "'fetus protection" policies under Title VII. the
court does not address this language in any detail. The apparent inconsistency between it and the
court's position may well be reconcilable, but the rationale for such a reconciliation does not
appear to be found in the decision. Rather, the court simply notes that if it were to limit the
employer to the BFOQ defense, it would "prevent the employer from asserting a justification
defense which under developed Title VII doctrine it is entitled to present." 697 F.2d at 1185 n.21.
111. Williams, supra note 99.
112. Clement Associates, Inc., supra note 9, at VII-4. See also Bollin, Genes and Gender in the
Workplace, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY, Jan. 1982, at 16.
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exposure of male employees to a reproductive hazard, they may begin
to provide safer work environments. As noted by Williams:
The option of excluding workers at risk may well seem less attractive in
light of such evidence than it did when the employer assumed that only
women workers transmitted fetal hazards. A workplace composed ex-
clusively of sterile men and women and post-menopausal women will
be unappealing to most employers. Under these circumstances, the em-
ployer may be inspired to develop solutions short of exclusion, thus not
only protecting itself from liability and advancing the health of off-
spring but promoting the employment interests of workers as well."3
IV
OTHER MECHANISMS FOR PROTECTIVE RELIEF
In addition to specific statutory remedies, more general avenues of
relief are available. The two most important of these are the equitable
injunction and the collective bargaining agreement.
A. Injunctive Relief
Through injunctive relief one can, under appropriate circum-
stances, obtain a court order prohibiting another from taking or contin-
uing a particular action. The injunction has often been used to protect
health or safety by preventing hazardous activity or by abating hazard-
ous conditions.' 4 Landowners, for example, have been granted in-
junctions against neighboring factories to prevent excessive noise,
production of noxious fumes, and a host of other hazards.' 5 Although
the availability of injunctive relief varies with the facts of each case, the
right to an injunction is based on three factors: continuing or recurrent
risk of irreparable harm, a legal duty to refrain from causing such
harm, and the inadequacy of other available remedies at law." 6 As a
113. Williams, supra note 99. at 703-04.
114. A general discussion of the availability of injunctive relief to abate workplace hazards
can be found in Blumrosen, Ackerman. Kligerman, VanSchaick & Sheehy, Injunctions Against
Occupational Hazards. The Right to Work L nder Safe Conditions, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 702 (1976), 1
INDUS. REL. L.J. 25 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Blumrosen].
115. See, e.g., Proulx v. Basbanes, 354 Mass. 559, 238 N.E.2d 531 (1968) (laundry and dry
cleaning business enjoined from causing excessive noise and vibrations): Terhune v. Trustees of
Methodist Episcopal Church, 87 N.J. Eq. 195. 100 A. 342 (1917) (trustees of church enjoined from
ringing 2,050 pound bell announcing the hour); Lunda v. Matthews, 46 Or. App. 701, 613 P.2d 63
(1980) (injunction lodged against cement plant producing dust, noise, and noxious fumes).
116. Certainly, trial courts exercise discretionary power to grant or deny an injunction. See,
e.g., Chicago Stadium Corp. v. Scallen. 530 F.2d 204 (8th Cir. 1976). The decision will depend on
the facts of each case, the jurisdiction, and the statute or common-law principle upon which relief
is sought; Nonetheless, evidence of irreparable harm, a legal duty to refrain from causing the
harm, and inadequacy of alternative relief is a prerequisite for obtaining an injunction. See gener-
ally 42 AM. JUR. 2D Injunctions §§ 23-68 (1969). When seeking a temporary injunction, the plain-
tiff must also demonstrate the likelihood of ultimate success on the merits. See generally
Leubsdorf, The Standard/for Preliminarv Injunctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978), which dis-
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number of reproductive hazards in the workplace appear to meet these
criteria, injunctive relief may be a useful mechanism for abatement.
Injunctions may prove especially valuable in dealing with hazards pri-
marily affecting offspring, rather than parents, as most states provide
rights of action for such hazards at common law."7
A threshold question is whether federal and state statutes gov-
erning worker health and safety preclude injunctions against workplace
hazards. The OSH Act clearly does not. Section 4(b)(4) of the Act
expressly disclaims any attempt to "affect . . . the common law,""8
and the legislative history of the general duty clause specifically ac-
knowledges an employer's duty under state law to provide a safe and
healthful place of employment." 9 In general, state workers' compensa-
tion statutes specifically preempt actions "at law" for workplace inju-
ries.' 20 The unquestioned goal of workers' compensation, however, is
to provide a uniform mechanism for the compensation of particular
workplace injuries after they have occurred,'2' and not to provide a
specific mechanism for the prevention of those injuries. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude that, in the absence of an express provision pre-
cluding injunctive relief, workers' compensation poses no bar to the use
of the equitable injunction to abate workplace hazards. A recent com-
mentary,'22 and a recent decision of the New Jersey Superior Court,'2 3
cusses the rationale for the standard governing the availability of interlocutory injunctions. The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS sets forth a more detailed scheme for determining which fac-
tors are relevant when deciding whether to grant or deny permanent or temporary injunctions. It
states:
(1) The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction against a tort depends upon a
comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, including the following primary
factors: (a) the nature of the interest to be protected. (b) the relative adequacy to the
plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies. (c) any reasonable delay by the plaintiff in
bringing suit. (d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (e) the relative
hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is
denied, (f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and (g) the practicability of
framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
(2) The appropriateness of an interlocutory injunction against a tort is determined in
the light of the factors listed in Subsection (I ). as presented prior to final hearing. but
depends primarily upon the following special factors: (a) the extent of the threat of ir-
reparable harm to the plaintiff if the interlocutory injunction is not granted. (b) the con-
sequences that the interlocutory relief may have upon the defendant, (c) the probability
that the plaintiff will succeed on the merits, and (d) the public interest.
Id § 936.
117. See generally ifra text accompanying notes 168-171. and the material cited therein.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (1976).
119. SENATE REPORT, supra note 36, acknowledges "a long-established statutory precedent in
both state and Federal law to require employers to provide a safe and healthful place of employ-
ment." Id. at 10.
120. See, e.g., 81 AM. JUR. 2D, Workmen's Compensation. § 52 (1976).
121. See, e.g., Morris v. Baker Auto Parts, 57 Mich. App. 65, 225 N.W.2d 179 (1974): Cline v.
Avery Abrasives, Inc., 96 Misc. 2d 258, 263-64, 409 N.Y.S.2d 91. 95 (1978). Both cite compensa-
tion as the "primary purpose" of workers' compensation legislation.
122. Blumrosen, supra note 114, 64 CALIF. L. REV. at 720, 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. at 43.
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are in accord with this view.
Nonetheless, the successful suit to enjoin an employer from main-
taining a reproductive hazard in the workplace will demand both crea-
tivity and diligent preparation. While a state common law or statutory
duty to provide a healthful workplace may not be difficult to establish,
many of the hazards for which abatement is sought will be those inher-
ent in the normal operation of the industry in question. In this situa-
tion, the maintenance of the hazard may well be consistent with the
generally accepted standards of care within the industry. Although an
inadequate industry-wide standard of care need not bar an action to
enforce a duty to provide a healthful work environment,'2 4 the courts
will probably consider carefully the economic consequences of a more
stringent standard. 2 5 Those seeking the injunction should thus be in a
position to demonstrate that abatement of the hazard will be economi-
cally viable. This will commonly require identification of the control
mechanisms or alternative production methods which are available to
abate the hazard, and an approximation of the costs and benefits flow-
ing from their adoption.
The harm in question should be carefully described. While injury
to reproductive health is clearly "irreparable," in that it cannot be ade-
quately compensated by monetary damages, the risk of that injury
must be concrete and demonstrable, not merely speculative.'2 6 In the
case of mutagens and teratogens, then, plaintiffs may need to present a
quantitative estimate of increased human risk in the workplace. If the
increased risk to the individual worker is small, all similarly situated
workers within the industry could be joined in a class-action suit.'2 7
Finally, plaintiffs will need to show the inadequacy of other avail-
able remedies. Compensatory remedies are usually inadequate to ad-
dress continuing hazards, as effective compensation necessarily
123. Shimp v. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co., 145 N.J. Super. 516, 524, 368 A.2d 408, 412 (1976).
124. The principle that courts, not industry, must ultimately set legal standards finds perhaps
its most famous pronouncement in the following words of Justice Learned Hand in The T.J.
Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932): "Courts must in the end say what is required: there are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission." See
also Helling v. Carey, 83 Wash. 2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974) (court held opthalmologist negligent
for failing to administer glaucoma test to patient under age 40, in spite of universal practice not to
test such patients).
125. Generally, courts compare the probable consequences of imposing an injunction with the
probable consequences of granting other remedies. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 934(1),
936(l)(e).
126. The general rule that an injunction will not issue "upon mere fear, apprehension. or
possibility of injury" can be found in Arkansas La. Gas. Co. v. Fender, 593 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1979). For similar language in a case involving an allegation of possible exposure to
future nuclear power hazards, see Mid-Hudson Nuclear Opponents, Inc. v..Consolidated Edison
Co., 100 Misc. 2d 158, 162-63, 418 N.Y.S.2d, 883, 886 (1979).
127. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
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involves a multiplicity of claims for the same hazard. 28 Compensatory
mechanisms are especially inadequate in the case of workplace repro-
ductive hazards, since worker suits for ordinary negligence are barred
by workers' compensation laws, and those laws may provide little or no
compensation for reproductive injuries.'2 9
Plaintiffs must also demonstrate that effective relief will not be
available under the OSH Act. This may require proof of OSHA's fail-
ure to take timely and adequate steps to abate the hazard in response to
a worker request.'30 In addition, plaintiffs will need to demonstrate
that the hazard cannot be addressed effectively through control meas-
ures less costly than those being sought.' 3'
In some cases, OSHA may already have made a regulatory deci-
sion regarding the hazard in question. That decision will play an im-
portant part in the action for injunctive relief. Although it will not be
determinative, proof that the conduct sought to be enjoined violates an
OSHA standard will be some evidence of the health effects of the expo-
sure in question and could buttress a claim for injunctive relief. The
party seeking the injunction, however, must first demonstrate why ade-
quate relief could not be secured through an action to compel OSHA to
enforce the standard.3 2 On the other hand,. the employer may offer
proof that OSHA considered the health effects of the exposure and
chose not to set a standard, or set a standard deemed inadequate by the
128. See generallv Blumrosen.supra note 112, 64 CALIF. L. REV. at 715. 1 INDUS. REL. L.J. at
38. A scheme for evaluating the adequacy of compensatory tort mechanisms is set forth in RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 944.
129. As reproductive injury does not usually cause a loss of earning or earning capacity-
except in the case of a pregnant worker forced to leave the job because of exposure to a fetal toxin.
mutagen, or teratogen-compensation would probably be most often extended for loss of faculty.
As reproductive damage, to worker or offspring, is not usually Listed on the formal schedule.
compensation would probably be extended under an 'other cases" clause in the statute, where one
exists. Compensation under these clauses tends to be rather low. See, e.g.. MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 152. § 3 6 (j) (West 1981) (Limiting award to $8500).
130. As a practical matter, requesting OSHA action will often precede a decision to seek
injunctive relief. Thus. the adequacy or inadequacy of OSHA's response will commonly be a
matter of record. Nonetheless, Blumrosen, supra note 112, provides a spirited and informative
argument against requiring exhaustion of all OSH Act remedies as a prerequisite to injunctive
relief.
131. For example, if the injunctive relief requested is the source-point control of a gaseous
emission, the evidence should indicate that worker health cannot be protected through the mere
installation of fans to improve workplace ventilation.
132. Where a right of mandamus against OSHA is deemed an adequate alternative remedy,
see supra note 59, an action for injunction may not lie. See generally, 42 AM. J R. 2D Injunctions
§ 43 (1969). Thus, in order to exhaust all available administrative remedies. an employee should
sue for injunction only after OSHA declined to take appropriate action, or has indicated its un-
willingness to enforce their standard. Alternatively, the plaintiff could join the action against
OSHA with the suit for injunction and thus bring all principal parties into a single tribunal. The
court could then determine the proper avenue for judicial relief. This approach. however requires
the plaintiff to file the action in federal court.
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exposed worker, as an argument against injunctive relief. Here again,
the OSHA position may not be determinative, but the party seeking the
injunction must be prepared, nonetheless, to demonstrate why OSHA's
response was inadequate, and why an action against OSHA would not
suffice. 133
A practical impediment to an action for injunctive relief may be
the fear of employer reprisal. It need not be. In addition to the protec-
tion against discrimination offered by the OSH Act, TSCA, and appli-
cable collective bargaining agreements, 34 recent decisions in many
states have recognized an employee's common-law right to be free from
retaliatory employment practices, and have imposed tort liability on
employers who engage in such practices.'35 Some states have enacted
"whistle blower" statutes which offer protection to employees who ex-
ercise their legal rights in job-related matters.'3 6 Thus, a worker who
brings a good-faith action to enjoin an employer from maintaining a
workplace hazard may well have a right of redress if the employer re-
taliates. Indeed, if the worker suspects that retaliation will occur. he or
she should request an injunction against retaliation in the pleadings.
B. The Collective Bargaining Agreement
Another useful preventive mechanism is the collective bargaining
prbcess. Health and safety considerations are a mandatory subject of
133. See supra note 132. An agency standard, or other evidence of regulatory action, may not
always be admissible in court. The trend, however. is clearly toward admissibility. A recent
survey of reported tort decisions found that such evidence was admitted in about 75% of the cases.
Heaton. Allar & Maier, The Lses of Regulatory Evidence in Tort Actions.' Automobiles, Consumer
Products. and Occupational Safety and Health, 4 J. PRODUCTS LIABILITY 231, 252 (1981).
134. See OSH Act § l1(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (1976): TSCA § 23, 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1976).
Provisions in collective bargaining agreements, of course. will vary widely: many agreements will
not be helpful.
135. See, e.g., Palmateer v. International Harvester Co.. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981)(tort of retaliatory discharge recognized when employee discharged for informing police of a fel-
low emplovee's suspected criminal behavior) Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668. 428 A.d 1317(1981) (court recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge of an employee who had filed a
workers' compensation clairn); Barrett v. Sam P. Wallace Co., C81-691R (W.D. Wash. Aug. 17,
1981) (order dismissing certain claims) (employee had a viable claim under Washington law when
he alleged that he had been discriminated against because he opposed his employer's policy re-
stricting an employee's right to report safety violations to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).
See also 81 AM. JUR. 2D Workmen's Compensation § 55 (Supp. 1982) (citing recent cases on this
topic). But see Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212 (5th Cir.). cert. denied, 449 U.S. 952(1980) no cause of action under Mississippi statutes or common law for retaliatory employment
practices).
136. Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act. MICH. COMP. L.AWS ANN. § 15.361-.369(West 1981), for example, prohibits retaliatory action against an employee because he or she "re-ports or s about to report . .. a violation or suspected violation of a law or regulation .." d.§ 15.362. An employee attempting to enforce an OSHA standard, or to enforce compliance with
the general duty clause of Section 5 of the OSH Act, would appear to be within the purview of this
protective statute.
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collective bargaining. As workers learn of the potential effects of work-
place hazards on their ability to bear children, they may seek to include
abatement or reduction of reproductive hazards as a term of their col-
lective bargaining agreement.' 3 7 Union negotiators, however, should
be sure not to waive the right to utilize any other avenues of relief.'38
V
COMPENSATORY MECHANISMS AS PROTECTIVE RELIEF
Prevention of damage to reproductive health is obviously prefera-
ble to monetary compensation for such damage once it has occurred.
Nonetheless, actions seeking compensation for past injuries will often
have the effect of preventing similar injuries in the future. The poten-
tial for such a prophylactic effect is certainly present in the case of
workplace reproductive hazards. An award of monetary damages in a
successful suit for serious reproductive injury is likely to be high. A 21-
year-old woman who contracted vaginal cancer as a result of her
mother's exposure to DES, for example, was recently awarded $2.25
million in a claim against the manufacturer.' 39 An award for congeni-
tal malformation, or for the sterility of a childless spouse, may also be
substantial. The size of these awards will not go unnoticed by those
who may have to pay them. As suits for reproductive hazards in the
workplace become more prevalent, employers will have strong
financial incentives to reduce their exposure to future liability. The
critical task, of course, will be to ensure that the precautions taken are
proper.
As discussed above, employers have already indicated concern
over potential liability for damage inflicted on a fetus by workplace
teratogens.'40 Rather than reducing the level of teratogenic hazard,
however, many have sought merely to exclude fertile women from the
workplace.' 4 ' Similarly, manufacturers facing potential products lia-
bility claims have lobbied for legislation which would make it more
difficult to file such claims.'4 2 If compensatory mechanisms are to
137. This possibility was raised by Anthony Mazzocchi of the OiL, Chemical and Atomic
Workers International Union in a lecture delivered at the Harvard School of Public Health in
October 1981.
138. For a general discussion of the extent to which unions may permissibly waive the rights
of its members, see Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the NLRA. Part 1, 4 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 335 (1981).
139. Axler v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, 10 PROD. SAFETY & LAB. REP. (BNA) 298 (Pa. C.P.
Philadelphia County, March 24, 1982).
140. See supra text accompanying note 38.
141. See supra text accompanying note 39.
142. This has been an ongoing effort on both the federal and state level. The recent drive has
been for the passage of a uniform federal products liability law which would preempt the common
law and statutory remedies now available in the various states. The proposal is intended to benefit
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serve as a meaningful incentive for prevention, action to counter such
efforts may also be needed.
There are two principal means of compensation for damages re-
sulting from exposure to workplace hazards: workers' compensation
laws, and common-law and statutory tort remedies. Most workers'
compensation statutes provide inadequate coverage for reproductive
injuries.l4 3 The tort system may thus be far more effective in prevent-
ing reproductive hazards. Four principal defendants may face tort lia-
bility for reproductive injuries: the employer, the manufacturer, and
supervisor, and the medical professional.
A. Claims Against the Employer
Most claims against an employer will be based on allegations of
negligence or intentional conduct. As most employee claims for negli-
gence will be barred by workers' compensation laws, negligence actions
will most commonly be filed on behalf of offspring,'44 or by spouses
seeking damages for loss of consortium.' 45 A plaintiff must establish
both a breach of a duty to adhere to a particular standard of care and
an injury which arose as a proximate result of that breach. Mere cita-
tion of an employer's common-law duty to provide a safe and healthful
workplace may not be sufficient to establish the desired standard of
care. As discussed above, the maintenance of a reproductive hazard
may be consistent with generally accepted industry practice.' 46 Ac-
cordingly, plaintiffs will often need to demonstrate that the standard of
care imposed by law is more exacting than that practiced within the
industry, as is apparent from the identity of its sponsors. The recently formed American Corpo-
rate Counsel Association, for example, endorsed the concept as one of its first acts. Group of
Corporate Lawyers Endorses Federal Tort Reform, 10 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 346
1982). The National Association of Manufacturers is sponsoring a letter-writing campaign to
persuade the Administration to support the proposal. Write to DOC, White House, Industry Group
Lges Companies, 10 PROD. SAFETY & LAB. REP. (BNA) 383 (1982).
143. 2 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION §§ 57.14. 58.33 (1981).
144. The right of the child to sue for his or her own damages caused by exposure of a parent
to a reproductive hazard is consistent with conventional tort doctrine, and has been recognized in
a growing number of jurisdictions. See infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text.
145. The right of a spouse to sue for loss of consortium is, at this point. less well-recoanized.
In some states an individual has an independent right of action against his or her spouse's em-
plover for negligent or intentional impairment of the marital relationship caused by work-related
injuries, even where the spouse has already received workers' compensation. Copelin v. Reed
Tool Co., 610 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1980) (cause of action if employer's conduct intentional). In
Ferriter v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 1980 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 2075, 413 N.E.2d 690
11980). the spouse and the minor children were held to have such a right. Other states have
adopted a contrary position, holding that a workers' compensation statute destroys the spouse's
common law action for loss of consortium. E.g., Cassaccia v. Green Valley Disposal Co.. 62 Cal.
App. 3d 610, 133 Cal. Rptr. 295 (1976).
146. See supra text accompanying notes 124-125.
____ I 
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industry.'47 At least three approaches may aid plaintiffs in such efforts.
If the employer's conduct in exposing the worker to the hazard
violated an applicable OSH Act or TSCA regulation, or any other fed-
eral or state health or safety regulation, the employer may be found
negligent as a matter of law.' 48 Also, if it can be shown that the indus-
try standard was "recognized" as hazardous within the industry, or by
the employer in question, a violation of the OSH Act's general duty
clause may be established.'4 9 Such proof might also establish a corre-
sponding common-law duty of care. Finally, in the absence of an ex-
isting regulatory directive or specific employer or industry knowledge,
plaintiffs must challenge the adequacy of the industry standard and ad-
vocate a stricter common-law duty to protect worker health. 50
In addition to breach of an appropriate standard of care, the plain-
tiff must also establish that his or her injury was proximately caused by
the exposure in question. Proof of a causal connection is difficult in
any lawsuit involving environmental exposure to toxic substances. It is
generally impossible to conclusively establish that a particular injury
grew out of a particular exposure. However, the injured party gener-
ally need only establish the causal connection by a preponderance of
the evidence.' 5 ' This burden, while substantial, is not impossible to
meet in appropriate circumstances. Expert testimony regarding causa-
tion, however, should always be buttressed by relevant epidemiological
and/or toxicological data, and medical testimony which tends to rule
out other means of causation.'5 2 This approach is particularly appro-
priate in cases involving reproductive hazards, since many of the resul-
tant injuries are relatively rare.' 53
In addition to claims for negligence, a worker's offspring or spouse
147. See supra note 124.
148. Heaton, Allar & Maier. supra note 133.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
150. Courts may be willing to impose a higher standard for reproductive hazards than for
other workplace hazards, since reproductive hazards directly affect both workers and their
children.
151. The appropriate standard is whether it is more likel/ than not that the injury in question
was caused by the suspect exposure. See generally 30 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1164 (1967).
152. See, e.g., Miller v. Nat'l Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 2.7, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1960).
153: For example. although male sterility can be caused by factors other than occupational
exposure, E.g. Woolhandler, supra note 15, it is something less than an everyday occurrence. An
increased incidence of sterility among male employees at a particular workplace will Likely raise
considerable suspicion. If the workplace environment contains a known chemical sterilant, the
cases of sterility can be correlated statistically with exposure to that chemical, and other potential
causes can be excluded or discounted, the evidence would arguably be sufficient to survive a de-
fendant's motion for summary judgment or dismissal. The evidence would then be submitted to
the trier of fact on the issue of probable causation and the traditional criteria-such as the credi-
bility of lay and expert witnesses and the persuasiveness of arguments on causality-would be
determinative.
_____IIIIIII_IIC___ 
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may, in the appropriate case, sue the employer for intentional infliction
of reproductive damage. Significantly, this may also provide the
worker with a direct avenue of relief against the employer, as the right
to bring suit for intentional torts is in many states not barred by work-
ers' compensation.' '4 In addition to proof of the necessary causal con-
nection, a successful suit for intentional tort requires proof that the
defendant intended to cause the injury in question. The concept of "in-
tentional" action, however, could be interpreted broadly in the area of
toxic substance exposure. Indeed, recent cases indicate that an em-
ployer runs a significant risk of liability in intentional tort if it willfully
or recklessly exposes its employees to substances which it knows to be
dangerous.'55 Further, employers have been held liable in intentional
tort for fraudulently concealing from a worker the fact that he or she
was suffering adverse effects from toxic substance exposure in the
workplace.' 56 Similarly, an employer might also be held liable for in-
tentionally concealing the fact of exposure itself, or the toxic nature of
the exposure.
In appropriate circumstances, an employer that knowingly exposes
its employees to toxic substances might also be liable for the tort of
outrage, or the related tort of intentional infliction of emotional harm.
In either case, liability could be imposed where the employer's action
in permitting the exposure was so egregious as to exceed the bounds
"usually tolerated by decent society. "' 57 Imposition of such liability
would appear particularly appropriate in the case of employers who
willfully expose their employees to reproductive hazards with full
knowledge of the potential consequences. The intentional infliction of
sterility or birth defects, certainly, shocks the ordinary conscience.
A question that may come shortly to the fore is whether employees
may voluntarily waive their right to sue their employer in tort for dam-
154. Although benefits provided under a workers' compensation statute are generally speci-
fied to be the exclusive remedy available to the employee for claims against the employer, many
workers' compensation statutes specifically preserve an employee's right to sue the employer for
mtentional torts. For a discussion of cases construing these statutory provisions. see Annot.. 96
ALR 3D 1064 (1979).
155. E.g., Blankenship v. Cincinnati Milacron Chems. Inc., 69 Ohio St. 2d 608. 433 N.E.2d
572 (1982). See general/v Annot., 96 ALR 3D 1064 (1979) (division of authority as to the extent
that "reckless" conduct s beyond the exclusivity bar of workers' compensation).
156. E.g., Johns-Manvllle Prods. Corp. v. Superior Court, 27 Cal. 3d 465, 165 Cal. Rptr. 858.
612 P2d 948 (1980).
157. W. PROSSER. L..w OF TORTS 56 (4th ed. 1971). This cause of action is for mental and
emotional, as distinct from physical, injury. Regardless of whether suits for intentional conduct
are beyond the exclusivity bar of workers' compensation. suits for essentially emotional harm may
escape the exclusivity bar whenever the applicable workers' compensation statute provides no
remedy for mental or emotional injury. E.g. Broaddus v. Ferndale Fastner Div., 84 Mich. App.
593. 269 N.W.2d 689 (1978). See general/v Annot., 86 A.L.R.3D 454 (1978 & Supp. 1982) (availa-
bilitv of causes of action for emotional harm in the workplace context).
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ages to reproductive health. May an employer require such a waiver as
a condition of employment? Clearly, a worker's agreement to waive a
future child's right to sue for fetal damage would be unenforceable.'5 8
And, while the issue may be less clear, an employee's waiver of his or
her own right to sue may be equally unenforceable. Certainly an adult
may, in appropriate circumstances, agree to give up his or her right to
bring an action in tort. But given the strong public policy favoring a
safe and healthful workplace, and the likely inequality of bargaining
power between employer and employee, a waiver secured as a condi-
tion of further employment should be viewed with disfavor by the
courts. 59
B. Claims Against the Manufacturer
The manufacturer of a chemical substance may also be liable for
damage to reproductive health caused by the use of that substance in
the workplace. If such use was reasonably foreseeable at the time the
product was distributed, the manufacturer could be either strictly liable
or liable in negligence for the resultant damages. Proof of negligence
will be difficult when the manufacturer's methods of production com-
port with industry standards. The plaintiff may find it necessary to ad-
vocate a common-law standard of care which is more stringent than
industry practice. 60 Breach of an applicable TSCA standard, however,
may establish negligence as a matter of law.'61 When there is no
breach of statute or regulation, the most promising avenue for recovery
will be an action based on a theory of strict liability, which requires
proof that the product is both unreasonably dangerous and "defective."
Although the elements of this cause of action vary somewhat from ju-
risdiction to jurisdiction, a "defect" may exist if either the manufac-
turer failed to take adequate steps to warn prospective users of the
158. The public policy here is similar to that which prevents divorced or separated parents
from binding their children to a custody arrangement or a particular level of child support. The
contractual rights of the parent in establishing an agreement on child support is inferior to the
child's right to an appropriate custodial arrangement and an adequate level of support. E.g. Yee
v. Yee, 48 Hawaii 439, 404 P.2d 370 (1965): Leeming v. Leeming, 87 Nev. 530, 535-36. 490 P.2d
342, 345-46 (1971); Hehr v. Tucker. 256 Or. 254. 257-58. 472 P.2d 797, 798-99 (1970). Note, how-
ever, that waiver of the right to bring a statutory wrongful death claim for the death of the child or
fetus may be effective where the wrongful death statute is designed to provide compensation for
damage to the child's heirs rather than for damage to the child.
159. One commentator has taken this position, noting that such a waiver is "probably against
public policy and, therefore unenforceable." Stillman, supra note 97, at 16. Another, however,
suggests without discussion that employers "require susceptible workers who voluntarily choose to
remain in the workplace to sign a release of liability (on behalf of themselves and, if applicable,
the fetus) after consultation with a physician." Nothstein & Ayres, supra note 99, at 320.
160. See supra note 124.
161. Heaton, Allar & Maier, supra note 133.
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product of its potential danger,'62 or there was an alternative method of
manufacturing the product which would have avoided the danger, and
the social benefit of adopting that alternative outweighed its social
Cost.'63 Upon proof of a defect, the manufacturer of an unreasonably
dangerous product will be held strictly liable for all damages proxi-
mately caused by the product's foreseeable use. Depending on the cir-
cumstances, such proof might also establish liability for the tort of
outrage. 164
Products liability suits would encourage reduction of workplace
reproductive hazards in two important ways. Fear of liability would
prompt manufacturers to more thoroughly advise the employer of the
reproductive health hazards of their products. This, in turn. should
trigger the employer's fear of liability, and encourage implementation
of process change or control technology in the workplace. Further, a
successful products liability suit based on the "alternative method" ap-
proach should encourage the chemical industry to develop products
that perform their intended function without endangering reproductive
health.
C Claims Against Supervisory Personnel
Liability for workplace health hazards need not be limited to the
employer and manufacturer. In some cases supervisory personnel of
the employer or manufacturer, or treating or examining physicians or
nurses, may share in liability. For example, if a plant safety supervisor
knows of a reproductive hazard but refuses to remedy the problem she
may be personally liable for any resultant damage. Similarly, a super-
vising chemist who approves a particular chemical for commercial pro-
duction despite doubts about its safety could be personally liable if
those doubts proved justified. Key management personnel, such as cor-
162. E.g. Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155. 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975);
Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 469, 424 N.E.2d 568. 578 (1981);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). This is sometimes referred to as
the "consumer expectation test": the duty to warn extends to all dangers which were not reason-
ably expected by a consumer putting the product to its intended use. Recently, a question has
arisen as to the applicability of this doctrine where the manufacturer did not discover the danger.
and could not reasonably have been expected to discover it. at the time of the product's manufac-
ture and distribution. While acknowledging that this might well be a defense to a claim for
negligence, the Supreme Court of New Jersey nonetheless rejected it as a defense to a claim
grounded in strict liability. The court held that a strict liability claim for failure to warn would be
viable even where the manufacturer could not reasonably have known about the danger. Beshada
v. Johns-Mansville Prods. Corp., 10 PROD. SAFETY & LAB. REP. 481 (BNA) (1982). Contra
.Yariala. 523 F.2d at 158-59.
163. Baker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 430-31, 573 P.2d 443, 454-55. 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
236-37 (1978): Knitz v. Minister Mach. Co.. 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982). This
is still an emerging doctrine and has not been applied in many jurisdictions.
164. See supra text accompanying note 157.
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porate officers and directors, may also face personal liability if, with
knowledge of its adverse effects, they decide to sell or use a reproduc-
tive toxin.
Thus far, attempts to impose this form of personal liability have
been used infrequently. This may be because plaintiffs believe that su-
pervisors lack the personal resources to satisfy judgments and because
the doctrine of respondeat superior ordinarily holds the employer or
manufacturer liable for the acts of its agents and employees. 165 If those
in positions of responsibility know they are subject to substantial per-
sonal liability, they may agitate for management decisions that reduce
the likelihood of workplace damage to reproductive health.'66
D. Claims Against Medical Professionals
The medical profession, too, may bear liability for damages aris-
ing out of reproductive hazards in the workplace. Typically, a physi-
cian or nurse practitioner will see an employee periodically during the
course of his or her employment. Where the employment involves ex-
posure to a reproductive hazard, and where damage ultimately results
as a consequence of such exposure, a cause of action for professional
negligence may arise. A case for malpractice would require proof of
three factors: that the medical professional knew, or reasonably should
have known, that the worker was exposed to the hazard; that he or she
had a duty to render proper medical advice or take action with regard
to the exposure; and that he or she breached that duty.
In many cases, the existence of these requisite elements may de-
pend on the relationship between the medical professional and the
workplace. A physician who treats a number of workers from a partic-
ular workplace, such as a company doctor or an employee of a health-
maintenance organization that has contracted to provide medical serv-
ices as part of a workplace health-care plan, is likely to be in a better
position to know about the various chemicals present in the workplace.
Additionally, a physician or nurse who specializes in occupational
health may be held to a higher standard of care than the average practi-
tioner. The professional duty will vary with the circumstances of the
case, but will probably encompass an obligation to adequately warn
165. The exclusivity provisions of workers' compensation statutes will present a major diffi-
culty in suits against supervisors. Where the supervisor is the agent of the employer. a worker's
suit for negligence will ordinarily be barred by workers' compensation. However. where the su-
pervisor is an independent contractor, is acting outside the scope of his or her employment, or acts
"intentionally," a cause of action for personal liability may be viable. See generalv., Annot.. 21
A.L.R.3D 845 (1968 & Supp. 1982).
166. For an indication of industry concern about the potential for lawsuits of this nature, see
Kent. Civil and Criminal Liabilitv of Engineering Erecutives, CHEMICAL ENGINEERING PROGRESS,
Mar. 1978. at 11: Dale Martin. Sue Who.?, CHEMTECH, Mar. 1977, at 159.
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workers of the potential consequences of further exposure.'6 7
E. The Expanding Tort Rights of the Child and Fetus
Since many workers will bring compensatory actions for reproduc-
tive damage on behalf of the offspring, the growing judicial recognition
of a right to recover in tort for damage to the fetus is significant. Ini-
tially, the right was limited to recovery for damages resulting from a
prenatal exposure occurring after conception.' 68 More recently courts
have recognized a child's right to bring suit for damages caused by pa-
rental exposure occurring prior to conception.' 69 The trend toward rec-
ognition of this right seems likely to continue, as it is consistent with
the growing scientific proof that parental exposure to toxic substances
can indeed affect the health of a fetus conceived years later.
The rights of the stillborn child or the child not carried to full term
are more problematic. On the one hand, the fetus may be damaged as
a result of a workplace exposure, but die or spontanteously abort from
other unrelated causes. The fetus in this situation would have no right
to recover for damage caused by the workplace exposure."70 In many
instances, however, the stillbirth or spontaneous abortion will actually
be caused by the exposure. While the law is unclear, recent decisions
indicate that fetal rights in this case will depend on viability: where the
fetus is viable, a right of action may exist.'7 ' As this could leave the
167. For a discussion of the duty of a company doctor who undertakes to advise an empioee
about the health effects of an occupational exposure, see Hoover v. Williamson. 236 Md. . 03
A.2d 861 (1964); Annot., 10 A.L.R.3D 1071 (1966). For a discussion of the extent to which vworker
suits against treating physicians-especially company doctors--may be barred by the exclusivity
provisions of workers' compensation statutes, see Annot., 28 A.L.R.3D 1066 (1969).
168. This is the position taken in Second Restatement of Torts. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 869 comment d (1977). The original Restatement provided no cause of action for negli-
gent prenatal injuries. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. § 869 (1939).
169. Jorgensen v. Meade Johnson Laboratories, 483 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1973); Bergstreser v.
Mitchell. 448 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mo. 1977); Renslow v. Mennonite Hospital. 67 111. 2d 34. 367
N.E.2d 1250 (1977): Park v. Chessin. 88 Misc. 2d 222, 387 N.Y.S.2d 204 (Sup. Ct. 1976), a Fd. 60
A.D.2d 80, 400 N.Y.S.2d 110 (App. Div. 1977), modified, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807 N.Y.
1978). See also Annot., 91 A.L.R.3D 316 (1979).
170. The argument here is that, where the prenatal injury does not cause abortion or stillbirth.
the fetus suffers no actionable damage from that injury except to the extent that the injury contrib-
utes to post-natal difficulties. Perhaps because the impediments to recovery appear so strong. the
question appears not to have been litigated often. However. in a dissent to Todd v. Sandridge
Constr. Co.. 341 F.2d 75, 80 n.9 (4th Cir. 1964), Judge Haynsworth cites the hypothetical case of a
non-fatal prenatal injury which is eclipsed by the subsequent drowning of mother and fetus. and
argues that there would be no actionable damage to the fetus from the first injury. (A cause of
action for emotional damage to the parents, however, might still lie.)
171. A majority of the reported cases allow a cause of action where the fetus was viable. For
cases holding that there is no right of action if the fetus was not viable, see, e.g., Rapp vs.
Hiemenz. 107 Ill. App. 2d 382, 246 N.E.2d 77 (1969): Toth v. Goree. 65 Mich. App. 296. 237
N.W.2d 297 (1975). In both states, there is a right of action if the fetus was viable. See. e.g.,
Chrisafogeorgis v. Brandenberg, 55 Ill. 2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich.
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aborted fetus without a remedy, an expansion of fetal rights may be
warranted if fetal damage from workplace hazards is to be adequately
addressed.
VI
THE USE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL INFORMATION AS
AN AID TO PROTECTIVE MECHANISMS
As discussed at the outset, effective use of the various avenues of
preventive and compensatory relief outlined above will require the
ability to identify reproductive hazards and their specific effects. In
many cases, it will also require the ability to acquire and disseminate
relevant scientific and technical information in timely fashion.
Federal agencies are useful as sources of information on reproduc-
tive hazards. Reproductive hazards potentially can be regulated by a
variety of federal agencies. The most likely sources of regulation are:
the EPA under TSCA'72 and the air,'73 water,'7 4 and pesticide acts;'7 5
the Food and Drug Administration under the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act;'76 the Consumer Products Safety Commission under the
Consumer Products Safety Act;'77 and OSHA under the OSH Act.' 78
Other federal agencies. such as the National Institute for Occupational
Safety and Health (NIOSH), compile and maintain relevant informa-
tion on toxic substances. Where not protected by federal privacy or
trade secret laws, such information may be obtained either through
written request or the Freedom of Information Act.' 79
Information obtained from an agency may shed light on whether
an employer or manufacturer recognized the potential danger of a par-
ticular workplace hazard prior to exposing workers. Section 8(e) of
TSCA, for example, requires the manufacturer of a chemical substance
"who obtains information which reasonably supports the conclusion
that such substance .. . presents a substantial risk of injury to health"
130. 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971). See also Annot.. 84 A.L.R.3D 411 (1978). The existence and extent
of the right will vary with the wording of the applicable wrongful death statute, and may be
influenced by inheritance statutes which treat the rights of heirs of the unborn or stillborn. Where
no action is allowed on behalf of the fetus, the parents may still have an action for emotional
damages, and the mother may have an action for physical damages.
172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976).
173. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
174. Clean Water Act of 1977. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Safe Drinking
Water Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f (Supp. IV 1980).
175. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act. 7 U.S.C. §§ 135-136y 1976 &
Supp. V 1981).
176. 21 U.S.C. § 301-379 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
177. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2051-2084 (1981).
178. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
179. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
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to "immediately" provide such information to EPA.'80 Information
supplied in accordance with this section could prove valuable to a pro-
spective plaintiff in a products liability action.
In some situations workers may be able to compel a federal agency
to compile information on their behalf. Section 20(a)(6) of the OSH
Act, for example, authorizes an employee, through his or her employee
representative, to request that NIOSH investigate the potential health
effects of a suspected workplace hazard.' 8 ' Such investigations, termed
"Health Hazard Evaluation Surveys," could provide useful informa-
tion for future remedial action.'8 2 Even if the results of the survey do
not prompt regulatory action they may provide a basis for a worker's
refusal to perform hazardous work or for private injunctive relief. Ad-
ditionally, they may prove helpful in future actions for compensatory
relief.
The timely dissemination of data is equally important. From a
practical and legal standpoint, dissemination of data about potential
reproductive hazards to those who may have a duty to alleviate such
hazards may lead to abatement. For example, OSHA or EPA may find
it more difficult to avoid the regulation of a particular chemical expo-
sure if the agency is presented with detailed information regarding the
risk posed by such exposure. Similarly, an employer or manufacturer
who is provided with such information may not be able to justify a
subsequent failure to reduce or eliminate the exposure. The dissemina-
tion of relevant information to these potential defendants will be help-
ful in establishing future tort actions. More importantly, it may tend to
facilitate the correction of workplace reproductive hazards before liti-
gation becomes necessary. Dissemination of information may also es-
tablish a medical malpractice case. Where a physician or nurse is not
familiar with the various occupational exposures within a workplace,
there may be no duty to provide medical advice regarding those expo-
sures. The worker/patient can impose such a duty, however, by in-
forming the medical professional about the specific exposures and
requesting information about their impact on reproductive health.
A word of caution is appropriate here. A worker who is aware of
the potential consequences of occupational exposures may find her
right to tort relief barred or restricted by defenses predicated on such
knowledge. Depending on the law of the jurisdiction and the circum-
stances of the case, a plaintiff may be frustrated by claims of compara-
180. 15 U.S.C. § 2607(e) (1976).
181. 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(6) (1976).
182. For examples of Health Hazard Evaluation Surveys already completed, see NATIONAL
INSTITUTE FOR OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH, HEALTH HAZARD EVALUATION SUMMARIES
(1982) (available from U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, Public Health Service. Centers
for Disease Control, National Institute for Occupational Safety & Health. Cincinnati, Ohio
45226).
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tive negligence, contributory negligence, or assumption of risk.'8 3
Further, she may be unable to successfully maintain a products liability
action under the "failure to warn" doctrine. '4 Since prevention is the
goal, however, the risk is acceptable. If a worker instigates the appro-
priate preventive measures after learning of the existence of a repro-
ductive hazard, future action for compensation may not be necessary.
VII
CONCLUSION
The remedies outlined above, if properly utilized, can do much to
reduce occupational exposure to reproductive hazards. But the effort
cannot be piecemeal. These various actions will provide incentives for
change at different levels of the industrial process. Their integrated use
will bring about the most meaningful and pervasive reduction of dam-
age to reproductive health.
Industrial control of reproductive hazards-whether through the
reduction of exposure from existing processes or through a shift to less
hazardous technology-will come in two principal ways. Either indus-
try will change on its own in response to economic constraints, or it will
change in compliance with government regulation. Both the OSH Act
and TSCA provide attractive avenues for regulatory relief, as both ar-
ticulate a comprehensive federal policy for the control of occupational
toxins. Nonetheless, the limitations of the regulatory process and the
apparent unwillingness of OSHA and EPA to act aggressively against
183. These defenses will always be available in a negligent design case. Although the negli-
gence of the plaintiff is ordinarily not a defense to a strict liability action, there are some limita-
tions to this doctrine. See, e.g., Sanford v. Chevrolet Div, of General Motors Corp., as reported in
10 PROD. SAFETY & LIAB. REP. (BNA) 252 (Ore. 1982), where negligence not involving the negli-
gent failure to discover the dangerous condition was held to reduce the plaintiff's aware under
Oregon's comparative negligence law. Further, as discussed in the following note. assumption of
risk remains a viable defense to a strict liability action.
184. The fact that the plaintiff knows of the dangerous condition might well constitute as-
sumption of risk, which is the defense both to negligence and strict liability actions. RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment n (1965). Further, it might obviate the argument
that the manufacturer's failure to warn was the proximate cause of injury. See Martinez v. Dixie
Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457 (5th Cir. 1976): Burton v. L.O. Smith Foundry Products Co.. 529 F.2d
108 (7th Cir. 1976); Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer and Co.. 532 P.2d 1377 (Okl. 19751. But see
Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1976), where the court held that the
manufacturer could be held liable for negligent misdesign even where the plaintiff knew of the
danger if the manufacturer could reasonably have guarded against the problem. See also Palmer
v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 3 Wash. App. 508. 476 P.2d 713 (1970), where the court came close to
favoring a policy that would reject assumpuon of risk in products liability cases, Id at 517, 476
P.2d at 718-19:
It seems to us that a rule which excludes the manufacturer from liability if the defect of
the design of his product is patent but applies the duty if such a defect is latent is some-
what anomalous. The manufacturer of the obviously defective product ought not to es-
cape because the product was obviously a bad one. The law, we think, ought to
discourage misdesign rather than encouraging it in its obvious form.
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reproductive hazards suggest the need to pursue other avenues of con-
trol. The available "self help" mechanisms-both for prevention and
compensation--can provide an important complement to agency regu-
lation. On the one hand, they can provide economic-and, in the case
of injunctive relief, judicially-imposed-incentives for changes in in-
dustrial behavior. On the other hand, by focusing on a particular prob-
lem, they can bring about comprehensive regulation.
In utilizing and refining the various regulatory and legal mecha-
nisms discussed here, however, one should not lose sight of the under-
lying political context. These remedies developed, in large part, out of
a strong and organized concern for workplace health and safety. With-
out a concentrated effort to maintain that level of concern, we could see
some of these avenues of relief narrowed. or even eliminated. It is per-
haps the extent to which they can be used as political, as well as legal,
tools that will ultimately determine whether they can safeguard the re-
productive health of workers and their offspring.
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